For You


2011 SIS Annual Report

Bratislava, October 2012
  1. Introduction
  2. SIS Strategic Focus
    1. Security
    2. Counter-terrorism
    3. Illegal migration
    4. Counter-Intelligence Protection
    5. Organized Crime Combat
    6. Defence Industry Product Trading and Proliferation
    7. Extremism
    8. Pseudo-religious Groupings
    9. Protection of classified information, personal and industry security clearances
    10. Economic Sector
    11. Corruption and Cronyism
    12. Inefficient Management of State and Municipality-owned Assets
    13. Customs, Tax and Financial Frauds
    14. Foreign Economic Relations of the Slovak Republic
    15. Foreign Politics
    16. Russian Federation
    17. Ukraine
    18. Belarus
    19. Areas of Crises and Conflicts
  3. Intelligence Protection of the Ice Hockey World Championship in 2011
  4. Cooperation with State Bodies and Notification Duty
  5. State of Affairs, Basic Activities and SIS Oversight
    1. SIS Staffing
    2. Basic Indicators
    3. Technical and Material Supplies, State of Affairs and SIS Budget Spending
    4. SIS Budget
    5. Technical and Material Supplies
    6. Technical Intelligence Means
    7. Cooperation between SIS and Foreign Intelligence Services
    8. Legislation and Supervision
    9. Legislative Activity
  6. Conclusion

1. Introduction

This report refers to the 2010 annual report of Slovak Information Service (SIS). It provides information of status, activities and results achieved in the performance of SIS in 2011.

SIS guarantees intelligence protection of the state in the security system of the Slovak Republic. In compliance with the Act 46/1993 Coll. on Slovak Information Service, it has been established as a civil intelligence and security service. The SIS Act defines its tasks, position, organisation, external oversight system provided by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, obligations and rights.

Within the scope of its competence and rights, SIS collects, gathers and evaluates intelligence. Following the conditions provided in the Act it also exercises its rights associated with active security prevention.

SIS, within its competence and rights, collects and provides the legally defined recipients with information of the most critical threats to the constitutional system, internal order and security and information focused on the protection of foreign political and economic interests of the state.

In compliance with the applicable Strategic Security Focus SIS focuses particularly on counter-terrorism and organized crime, extremism, illegal migration, money laundering and illegal trading in arms and dual-use material (proliferation).

In the economic sector SIS mainly monitors uneconomical or fraudulent asset management of the state and municipalities, corruption, clientelism in the state administration and municipalities, severe tax and duty frauds and threats to energy security of the Slovak Republic.

In the foreign security field SIS is oriented on crisis and conflict regions, potential consequences resulting from security and economic crisis abroad on interests, security and economy of the Slovak Republic.

In the intelligence security area SIS focuses its attention to threats in connection to classified information, foreign intelligence service activities and is involved in processes of personal and industrial security clearances.

SIS is an active collaborator with partner intelligence services and international organizations to avert security threats endangering common area in the focus of the Slovak Republic and EU and NATO member-states in terms of security protection of the international community.

Last year SIS processed 444 pieces of intelligence for recipients in the referred areas. A statistics summary of intelligence production is provided in this report. A volume of analytical and operative information exchange with partner intelligence services is also considerable. SIS performing its intelligence tasks in 2011 positively contributed to the protection of the constitutional order, state security and protection and enforcement of foreign political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic.

2. SIS Strategic Focus

2.1 Security


In 2011 SIS reported no immediate terrorist threat on the territory of the Slovak Republic (SR)1 neither involvement of persons from SR in orchestrating a terrorist attack abroad. Security conditions in SR remain stable. No extremist manifestations and declarations supporting so-called al-Qaeda Core were reported.

Decentralization and diversification of the international terrorist network al-Qaeda Core and the Arab Spring events that resulted in a more considerable autonomous action of the al-Qaeda branches operating mainly in the MENA region had no direct impact on the security situation in Slovakia in 2011.

In the evaluated period a risky trend of “individual jihad” was growing. It was supported by statements of powerful Islamists, aggressive Internet propaganda and calls for individual terrorism. A number of terrorist attacks performed by individuals or small isolated groups will probably grow, especially due to low costs, low risk of revelation and high efficiency. Isolated actions of individuals (so-called lone wolves) inspired by the international terrorist al-Qaeda Core’s ideology pose the highest risk.

A rising number of lone wolf attacks was not only seen in Islamic terrorism but it also engaged people who were frustrated and did not identify themselves with the principles and values of the democratic society. Counter-terrorism regarding this phenomenon was therefore in the centre of intelligence focus in the evaluated period.

In 2011 SIS chaired an interdepartmental Expert Group on Information Exchange and Analysis Coordination and Counter-terrorist Collaboration at the National Level in the Slovak Republic. The key agenda of SIS during its presidency of the Expert Group in 2011 was to create and complete the proposal of the national scale of terrorist threats.

Illegal Migration

Slovakia remains to be a transit country2 for illegal migrants and the number of illegal crossing of the Slovak state border is decreasing. A relatively positive development of illegal migration resulted from the implementation of strict asylum policy, international collaboration and adoption of efficient security steps directly at the Schengen border with Ukraine.

Besides crossing the green border, forgery and doctoring of SR documents, organized smuggling groups started to use other sophisticated migration methods not directly perceived as unauthorised crossing of the state border. Foreigners trying to enter the Slovak Republic and then the Schengen area started misusing legally issued visa and residency permits in SR to a larger extent.3 Marriages on purpose were also used more frequently as they were supposed to provide migrants with a stay in Slovakia. Smuggling groups addressed mainly women of a lower class status. The structure of nationality of illegal migrants entering SR changed due to unfavourable humanitarian and difficult security conditions in the Horn of Africa. Related to the conditions in 2010, the number of illegal migrants from Somalia dramatically increased. SIS advised of potential security threats arising from possible links of Somali migrants to the radical Islamic terrorist groups operating in the region of Horn of Africa, especially the Somali militant movement al-Shabaab (one of the most active branches of al-Qaeda Core).

SIS also warned of African illegal migrant groups (especially Nigerians) travelling without identification documents. When detained they tended to pretend not to be Somali in order to get the most beneficial position in the asylum seeking process.

Events of the Arab Spring in the MENA countries, which resulted in a stronger migration pressure on Europe4, had rather a short-term impact on Slovakia and did not bring any massive migration waves from these areas heading for Slovakia.

With respect to the development of the international conditions, migration pressure on the EU region will be probably growing. Situation in Balkan and Mediterranean regions that are the focus of strong migration routes from Asia and Africa to Europe will become the most complicated one. . It is assumed that Slovakia will represent only a small part of migration routes leading to the EU and the Schengen area.

Counter-Intelligence Protection

Slovak Information Service gathered, collected and evaluated information about the activities of foreign intelligence services on the territory of SR. In 2011 several foreign intelligence services kept trying to infiltrate central bodies of the state administration, security forces of SR and influence public opinion. Their activities and interests expanded to the economic field.

In counter-intelligence protection, SIS successfully developed collaboration with partner services from the NATO and EU member-countries.

Organised Crime Combat

In 2011, within organised crime combat, SIS focused its attention on criminal activities of most critical domestic and foreign organized crime groups. In the assessed period SIS legally authorised recipients also received information of collaboration of crime group members with officials of the state administration, municipalities, police, courts and the prosecutor’s office in order to gain unlawful benefits from legal disputes, get assets owned by municipalities or orders for their legal business activities. Such links had a negative impact on investigation, security of citizens, municipality management and economic interests of the country.

Greater attention was drawn to the economic crime, especially to excessive VAT deduction and excise duty frauds from mineral oils, alcohol and tobacco. The state suffered considerable economic damages due to growing economic criminal activities committed by criminal groups. For the purpose of committing economic crime, large corporate networks were created both in Slovakia and abroad. In such cases, SIS collaborated with partner intelligence services.

In order to provide information, to prevent and to eliminate negative impacts of the most severe forms of the organized crime, SIS provided intensive liaison to local law enforcement bodies and co-operated with partner intelligence services and international organizations.

Defence Industry Product Trading and Proliferation

In the assessed period SIS was actively involved in the licencing process in the defence industry foreign trading. After the competences were returned back to the economy sector, it may be stated that the control mechanisms of licence issuance improved.

Last year several entities were engaged in issuing licenses for trading defence products in Slovakia. They often collaborated mutually on business cases. With respect to real available staffing, intelligence focus was made mainly on the most significant entities and risk-profile entities.

In 2011 no indications that Slovak entities or the Slovak territory were used for illegal defence product trading were confirmed. In the assessed period new mechanisms of the physical control of the real military stocks with selected entities and the control of development of specific business cases were introduced. SIS noticed efforts to rig a cheap sale of unnecessary military material from the assets of the defence forces.

SIS kept track of important tenders to be called or those in progress for the delivery of military material to the defence forces. In this respect the cases of uneconomical management of the state assets were reported.

As a part of proliferation of dual use materials SIS identified preparations for export activities of so-called sensitive goods from Slovakia to risk countries. If any of them had taken place they might have harmed foreign political or security interests of Slovakia.

In the period evaluated SIS controlled compliance and execution of international sanctions and participated in performance of obligations imposed to Slovakia in international treaties on control of conventional arm trading and dual-use material usage. SIS provided the state authorities with information of risk profiles of foreign businesses that were suspected of proliferation of dual-use technologies and materials to the sanctioned countries that could try to misuse the territory of Slovakia or entities registered in Slovakia for their proliferation targets.

SIS provided liaison to the Slovak bodies in a development of the Common Action Plan of the Slovak and U.S. Governments regarding illegal nuclear and radioactive material and technology handling.

SIS participated in the monitoring of the security of nuclear power plants and the nuclear material handling in Slovakia. In order to identify threats that might have had impact on a nuclear or operation security level of the nuclear power plants, SIS provided the legal recipients with its analytical support.


In 2011 SIS reported no activities of right or left-wing extremists that would pose a threat to the constitutional system of Slovakia. No activities of such groups tending to use terrorist means were identified.

Slovak right-wing extremists submitted their activities and demonstrations to the effort to become established on the political scene in 2011. Major topics presented by right-wing extremists concerned a difficult co-existence of the majority population with the Roma community, social issues and criticism of the state authorities.

From left-wing extremists, only anti-fascists escalated violence while the targets of their physical attacks were the supporters of right-wing extremists. Overall, related to 2010 the anti-fascist movement slightly decreased the level of its activities. Concerning Slovak left-wing extremism, there are active groupings promoting Marxist-Leninist ideology; however, they are marginal. Within left-wing extremism, there is no active massive anti-globalisation movement and no relevant activities organised by radical environmental associations were reported.

Slovak extremists intensified the usage of Internet social networks as a place for publishing their radical opinions and as a communication tool for encouraging their supporters.

Pseudo-religious Groupings

Regarding destructive sects and religious communities, in the evaluated period, SIS monitored activities of entities that spread their ideology and efforts in order to gain influence in the state, the private sector and the municipalities. They used substandard and non-transparent methods often to feather their own nest and negative influences on mental and physical health conditions of their supporters and their social conditions.

Protection of classified information, personal and industrial security clearances

In 2011 SIS contributed to the security clearance process conducted by the National Security Authority, Military Intelligence (Military Defence Service and Military Intelligence Service) and the Police Force. Information concerning security trustworthiness of individuals and entrepreneurs was provided to the applicants in the scope complying with the Act 215/2004 Coll. on The Protection of Classified Information (security clearance in compliance with classification level).

Regarding applications for military material trading permits SIS participated in the process of assessing trustworthiness of persons cleared under the special regulations of the Ministry of Interior, the Slovak Aviation Authority and provided statements to the Ministry of Economy. In the assessed period SIS processed 4,507 applications for vetting and industrial security clearance or evaluation of security trustworthiness.

In 2011 SIS conducted 4,280 administration clearances of persons. Within extraordinary security assignments the Service also conducted over 7,500 security clearances requested by the state bodies. SIS also handled requests of partner services.

Overall, SIS conducted nearly 29 thousand security clearances of various types in the evaluated period.

2.2 Economic Sector

Corruption and Clientelism

In 2011 SIS collected information indicating cases of corruption and clientelism in public procurement and allocation of funds from the state budget in local and regional municipality bodies, state administration institutions and entities with state ownership interest. Corruption and clientelistic procedures were identified in decision-making processes for granting non-refundable financial contributions from the European Union funds and giving subsidies from the state budget.

SIS monitored activities of some strong financial investment groups that play a significant role in the Slovak economy focusing on non-transparent activities damaging the economic interests of the Slovak Republic

Concerning the health care sector, attention was drawn to non-transparent activities of corporations gaining ownership interest in public health care facilities. The attention was focused mainly to corruption and lobbing practices of the investment group representatives. Their target was to gain monopoly in the health care market.

SIS informed the recipients of suspected corruption practices related to the manipulation of tenders for the development and modernization of transportation infrastructure in favour of vendors determined in advance. SIS also pointed out the corruption and manipulation of a tender for refurbishment of a building of a state institution.

The corruption activities were also recorded in tax administration bodies, e.g. income tax and VAT frauds and in customs administration bodies concerning frauds of excise duty on mineral oils and tobacco products and goods and export-related tax frauds.

SIS learned about non-transparent allocation of financial means from the EU funds and the state budget that were not utilised in compliance with the original purpose. As collected information showed, many projects reported signs of inefficient and non-purposeful spending of non-refundable financial means.

Inefficient Management of State and Municipality-owned Assets

Findings collected by SIS in the assessed period indicated continuous damaging of the economic interests of Slovakia in the state and municipality-owned companies.

The recipients were warned of the corruption and lobbying activities of interest groups and persons associated with influencing public procurement in these companies. To gain influence the process of public procurement was intervened deliberately and public tenders were avoided.

The cases of public tender manipulation were reported mainly in energy and heating plants. Non-transparent economy was also discovered in distribution and water management companies and in companies using transportation infrastructure.

The cases of harming state interests were discovered in forest management. Unbeneficial contracts with related parties were concluded for the delivery of wood and the sale of state-owned assets.

In the evaluated period, similarly to the past, a number of cases of suspected corruption behaviour of municipality officials was reported. They related to non-transparent and inefficient management of assets of the municipalities. Findings about unauthorised restitution claims, changes in title deeds and illegal taking over agricultural land were collected.

Customs, Tax and Financial Frauds

SIS warned about tax frauds related to exercising unauthorised VAT deductions, income tax evasions and excise tax frauds. Identified tax frauds were committed by both individuals and corporation networks. Tax frauds were often performed in cooperation with officials of tax and customs offices who were involved in the crime with those who committed it.

SIS notified the recipients of activities of tax entities that performed fictitious business transactions. They were used to exercise the excessive VAT deduction unlawfully and cut an income tax base which resulted in the income and value added tax evasion. The tax obligation was then shifted to other companies in which dummies, so-called “white horses”, played their part. Based on the chain fictitious or purposefully overpaid deals they asked tax offices for a refund of excessive VAT deductions whereas their suppliers did not pay VAT on the deals in question. Some regional criminal groups were also involved in the frauds.

Foreign Economic Relations of the Slovak Republic

In the area of foreign economic interests of Slovakia SIS brought its attention to risks of restriction or cut of strategic raw material supplies.

In terms of energy raw material transit, there is a growing risk of diversification of Russian export oil and gas routes to out-of-Slovakia corridors while Slovakia’s effort to diversify stagnated. From a global point of view an unstable situation in the North Africa and the Middle East poses a material risk for oil and gas supplies.

2.3 Foreign politics


In the evaluated period, a turbulent political and security development in the region of Middle East and North Africa continued. As a result of the global economic crisis and under the insignificant influence of new phenomenon of social networks, there were several confrontations between regimes and protesters in several Arab countries. In many cases these conflicts lead to falls of regimes that had been perceived as stable and unbeatable. However, many of these conflicts have not been solved and resulted in a long-term crisis (e.g. Syria) that destabilises the whole region. Positions of and relations between global players became complicated and this fact projected in their efforts to maintain or to gain power in newly forming areas. Anti-American mood increased in several regions.

West Balkan has not become stabilised due to a persisting ethnic relation difficulties. In some countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, the north of Kosovo), census was not carried out due to ethic disputes. Ethnic incidents are possible in areas, in which Slavonic and Albanian populations meet. Taking the persisting debt crisis in Eurozone into account, integration as a stabilising factor does not affect this as it did in past. International presence or the pressure of international community are still significant and contribute to calming the situation. Apart from ethnic tension, economic and financial problems of the states of the region as well as poor living standard of the population and negative impacts (links between political elites and organised crime) and corruption persist.

In this period, SIS focused primarily on Kosovo as the situation here is the most complicated one. An unsolved issue of its recognition and the problem of the status of its northern part still causes tension that created security crisis (the creation and the defence of barricades by the Serbs) that was relatively calm due to the presence of international missions. Early parliamentary elections in FYROM did not change the situation. Problems created by the dissatisfaction of the Albanian ethnic minority with their status continue. This creates tension in the government as well as in the society. The state remains divided ethnically. Unwillingness to make concessions concerning the name of the state results in the suspension of the progress within the Euro-Atlantic integration process.

Russian Federation

In the assessed period, SIS was monitoring political and economic development in the Russian Federation. In 2011, internal political development of the Russian Federation was affected by unsolved economic issues, non-systematic and slow enforcement of reforms, weakened position of the ruling party Unified Russia before the parliamentary elections and doubts of lobbying groups before the presidential elections.

Development in the republics in the North Caucasus posed security risks due to the fact that despite intensive efforts of the central government to reform social and economic areas did not stabilise the situation fully. Dagestan and the North Osetia saw an increase of terrorist attacks and of the number of radical Islam followers. In total, the number of terrorist attacks on Russian territory did not increase in the evaluated period but the attacks that were realised were more effective and more often publicised (Domodedovo airport).

In the foreign politics, possible threats to securing sources of energy into the Slovak Republic were caused by the tension between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and Belarus in the first half of the year.

The creation of European security system and especially the anti-missile defence system was the key security issue for the Russian Federation concerning Europe and the USA.


In the period evaluated, SIS was focusing on risks resulting from the tensions of internal political situation of Ukraine.

In the foreign politics area, it can be said that Ukrainian diplomacy returned to the policy of “manoeuvring” between the EU and the Russian Federation.


In 2011, SIS focused on the situation in the country after presidential elections in December 2010 and the effects of its results on foreign political orientation of Belarus.

Political opposition remained fragmented and was not able to offer alternative solutions to difficult economic situation to the Belarusian public.

Harsh suppression of opposition protests after the elections in 2010 worsened the relations between the EU and Belarus. Belarus was interested in joining Euro-Asian integration processes; it was receiving significant financial aid from the Russian Federation and was getting more and more under the Russian economic influence.

Areas of Crises and Conflicts

2011 saw important impulses for changes after a long-term stagnation of political development in the Middle East and North Africa that resulted in the falls of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Processes connected to the Arab spring phenomenon have not ended and continue to influence the regional situation. On one hand, the systems have shifted into a new, plural system in countries that saw the fall of the old regimes or the regimes themselves started political reforms as a mean of prevention of potential difficulties. On the other hand, urgent political and security crises in Yemen and especially in Syria occurred.

Due to the key geopolitical status of Syria in the region and possible effects of the Syrian crisis on the whole region, SIS focused its attention to the development in this specific country. SIS was monitoring continuing transformation of protests from local demonstrations with limited social and economic requests into a mass movement with wide political ambitions requesting the fall of the current regime. SIS warned about the potential of protests militarisation, sectarian violence and gradual complications in the security area that started to resemble emerging anti-government uprising in the evaluated period. The attention was also drawn to the way foreign political partners and opponents of the Syrian regime, esp. Russia, behaved and to their strategy in the context of incremental internationalisation of the Syrian crisis.

In 2011, in connection to the Arab spring, Egypt saw the fall of the regime and the overthrowing of the former president Hosni Mubarak. The country started to build its own democratic system. Army took over presidential responsibilities and set its priority to maintain stability in the transitional period, punish the elite of the previous regime, lead the country through the process of democratisation and hand over the power to civilian government within the period of six months. In the assessed period, Egypt was facing problems and challenges resulting from the instability of transitional period - continuing strikes, the worsening of the economic situation, the deterioration of the living standard, sectarian conflicts, the increase of nationalism and anti-Israeli attitudes, and the unreadiness of military lead to solve the current situation. Despite difficulties and lengthening time of handing over the power, the parliamentary elections took place at the end of the year, results of which mirrored the trend in after-revolutionary North African countries – the support of Islamist political entities by the public.

SIS was monitoring the development in Iran, especially concerning its nuclear programme that continued enriching uranium, extended the capacities and improved technological equipment. The cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was considered to be nontransparent and insufficient. Despite certain indications nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 group were not reopened in 2011.

As Iran does not comply with the requests of the international community that requires it to halt its nuclear programme and the results of the IAEA assessment report of on the Iranian nuclear programme, it faced intensified bilateral sanctions of the USA and EU focused on oil exports in late 2011 (a main source of Iranian income). Russia and China did not approve the new sanctions and they preferred solving the Iranian nuclear issue by diplomatic means. Throughout the year, relations between Iran and Israel were escalating; Israel repeatedly declared that it might consider unilateral military offence against Iranian nuclear programme facilities in near future.

Internal political scene in Iran saw weakening of power of the President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in relation to the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei.

Security situation in Afghanistan was complicated in 2011 as there was a high number of security incidents (comparable to that of 2010).

The country continued to prepare itself for the departure of the allied troop forces after 2014 and attempted to negotiate peace with the Taliban movement. Several initiatives leading to the political solution of the conflict were not successful. The reconciliation process was disturbed by militant terrorist attacks and an increased number of assassination attempts on governing Afghan political elite’s representatives. Pakistan was accused of influencing the country’s situation and that it supports the establishment of peace insufficiently.

Similarly to the previous period, in 2011 Pakistan also faced wide political, economic and social issues that were worsened by the economic crisis and a humanitarian catastrophe (floods) in the south of the country. The governing efficaciousness of the weak coalition that was mainly trying to preserve its power was very low. The military elite maintained its influence over country’s affairs; however, it did not seem to be interested in taking over the country through a military coup.

Central Asia was also in the focus of SIS in the evaluated period. Regional affairs were mainly affected by the fears of the regimes that unrests similar to those of the Arab spring might occur and by the preparations for security risks that might result from the departure of the allied troop forces from Afghanistan and by the consequent possible return of the Taliban movement. Restrictive measures that were taken by several Central Asian countries lead to intimidation and restriction of rights of citizens and media. As the opposition was weak and not united (except Kyrgyzstan) and population was not engaged in the process, no significant attempts inspired by the Middle East and North Africa situation occurred in 2011.

The question of successorship (esp. in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), social, economic and ethnic issues, radicalisation of citizens due to the restrictions of the freedom of religion, activities of organised criminal groups will become risk factors in the Central Asia region in the next period. Insufficient protection of borders with Afghanistan and a possible increase in penetration of radical Islamic groups into the region after the departure of international troop force might become a significant destabilising factor in future.

3. Intelligence Protection of the Ice Hockey World Championship in 2011


In order to prevent potential security threats connected with the Ice Hockey World Championship 2011 organised from 29 April to 15 May 2011 in Bratislava and Košice, SIS carried out intelligence activities, elaborated, adopted and coordinated security measures.

The service adopted several active measures; for instance, it checked more than 12,000 records, screened persons and other entities. Regarding the security situation during the World Championship, 22 records were compiled daily.

An early warning system of informing authorised persons who could take effective and appropriate measures to secure the World Championship or to prevent all possible threats to the World Championship was activated. SIS was cooperating in its activities with 23 foreign intelligence services in order to secure the World Championship.

SIS contributed to the cooperation with the subjects involved, eliminated security gaps, and took preventive measures. Recommendations and warnings of SIS were always accepted and employed as required. The cooperation between SIS and other entities was very open and constructive.

4. Cooperation with State Bodies and Notification Duty

According to the Act on Slovak Information Service, SIS uses official contacts with the state bodies, institutions and offices in order to gather information and supporting materials that might lead to clarification required for the fulfilment of the tasks as stated in the Act. SIS members establish official contacts upon SIS a Director General’s approval.

In 2011, SIS continued the cooperation with the Office of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, the Cabinet Office of the Slovak Republic and all ministries of the Slovak Republic and their subordinate units. SIS also cooperated with other state offices and institutions (approximately 20 altogether).

Within official contacts, SIS was gathering information and materials that were utilised during the elaboration process of analytical and operation activities and in order to supplement knowledge funds aimed to improve the output of the intelligence production. Reciprocal requests for information and analyses regarding intelligence priorities were used by other state bodies sporadically. SIS is ready to provide the state bodies with analyses and information they can use for managing and in their decision making processes upon their request.

SIS members established official contacts in connection with their participation on several interdepartmental platforms concerning state security.

Official contacts were also established to secure common activities of the service.

5. State of Affairs, Basic Activities and SIS Oversight

5.1 SIS Staffing

Basic indicators

As at 31 December 2011, SIS members totalled 84 % of the planned state; related to last year, the number decreased (as at 31/12/2010, SIS members totalled 89 % of the planned headcount). Personal structure according to the basic demographics remains unchanged when compared to previous years.

5.2 Technical and Material Supplies State of Affairs and SIS Budget Spending

SIS Budget

Draft of the budget of the budget chapter of SIS for 2011 was discussed and approved in the National Council of the Slovak Republic within the limits submitted by the Government of the Slovak Republic totalling EUR 38,946,174 for Information activity programme. Out of the total expenses the ordinary expenses totalled EUR 37,950,174 and capital expenses totalled EUR 996,000. Incomes approved totalled EUR 160,0005.

In 2011, SIS utilised expenses at 100 %; income totalled EUR 165,657. All binding budget indicators were met.

Technical and material supplies

In 2011 needs and requirements of the Service regarding technical and material supplies were saturated in the amount required for the fulfilment of the tasks; however, requirements for the technological development were not met. Unsuitable and obsolete technology exchange took place only in necessary cases and was very limited. The gap between dynamic development of information technologies and technological capabilities of SIS needed to fulfil tasks as stated by law has been widening for a few years.

5.3 Information and Technical Means

According to Section 10 (1b) of the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic 49/1993 Coll. on Slovak Information Service as subsequently amended and Section 2 (2) of the Act 166/2003 Coll. on the protection of privacy against unauthorised use of information and technical means amending and supplementing certain Acts (Act on the protection against interception) as subsequently amended, SIS is authorised to use information and technical means in order to carry out its legal tasks.

In 2011, SIS submitted 531 applications to use information and technical means6; judges issued 530 approvals; one application was rejected. One application was not processed due to technical difficulties.

Out of 529 uses of information-technical means, 339 cases were evaluated in terms of aims and purposes as stated by law as at 31 December 2011. Aims and purposes as defined by law were reached in 299 uses of the information and technical means; in 40 cases it were not. As at 31 January 2012, 190 pending cases could not be evaluated7.

Table: Use of information and technical means (ITM) in 2011

Number of uses Sec. 2(1) letter a) letter b) letter c) Total
Number of ITM use applications – Sec. 4 (1) 5 444 85 531
O/W: approvals 6 441 84 530
rejections 0 0 1 1
Number of ITM renewal applications to prolong the period of ITM use within the same case – Sec. 4 ( 2) 0 0 0 0
O/W: approvals 0 0 0 0
rejections 0 0 0 0
Number of ITM uses that reached legally set aims and purposes ** 3 247 49 299
Number of ITM uses that did not reach legally set aims and purposes ** 1 26 13 40
Number of illegitimate ITM uses 0 0 0 0
Total number of ITM use applications total of rows 1+4 5 441 85 531
Total number of approvals total of rows 2+5 5 441 84 530
Total number of rejections total of rows 3+6 0 0 1 1

Notes: * Each ITM renewal request counts as an individual ITM case.
** A number of closed and evaluated cases as at 31 January 2012 are included only.

Technical solutions applied along with strict organisation and control measures guarantee legality of ITM use and exclude the possibility of unauthorised access into monitoring system as well as data storage and archives.

Throughout 2011, there was not a single case of illegitimate use of information and technical means by SIS.


5.4 Cooperation between SIS and Foreign Intelligence Services

Regarding international cooperation in 2011, positive trends that had started in previous years continued. On the level of bilateral cooperation, mutual relations were strengthened and existing cooperation in both analytical and operation areas were deepened and extended. Currently, SIS bilaterally cooperates with more than 70 partner services.

Counter-terrorism, counter-extremism, illegal proliferation of dual use materials, illegal defence industry product trading, illegal migration, organised crime and foreign intelligence service activities were main topics of bilateral cooperation in the previous year. Cooperation also focused on the protection of security, political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic and monitoring of development in risk and conflict regions.

Active cooperation on multilateral level between intelligence services continues in accordance with the plans and the strategic focus of the service.

5.5 Legislation and Supervision

Legislative Activity

On the level of legislation, SIS cooperates with ministries, other state central bodies and other state bodies. In 2011, SIS evaluated more than 120 documents intended for interdepartmental consultation, ~30 of which were commented upon by the Service. The aim of the comments was to draw proposer’s attention to issues when applied and to provide assistance with the removal of these issues.


Under the supervision of the state, 16 planned inspections took place (4 comprehensive and 7 follow-ups, 1 inspection focused on the security of technical devices and 4 state health inspections).

6. Conclusion

In 2011, within its competence and authorities, SIS was gathering and providing legally authorised recipients with intelligence information; the Service thus fulfilled its intelligence tasks and contributed to the protection of constitutional order, the security of the state and the protection and the enforcement of foreign political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic.

(1) In late 2011 (28 December 2011) the explosion of an explosive device was initiated in front of McDonald’s in Kosice. It was performed by the so-called lone wolf (a culprit supporting radical environmental movements could have been inspired by individual terrorist acts in Europe to commit this bomb attack as they have been rising recently). No serious material damages or injuries were caused by the explosion. The attack and its motives (also the person of culprit) are being under investigation.

(2) Currently, there are three main routes of illegal migration to the EU: SOUTHER ROUTE (from Africa across the Mediterranean Sea to Spain, France and Italy), SOUTHERN and EASTERN ROUTE (across Turkey, Balkan and former Yugoslavia countries) and, from the Slovak point of view the most important, NORTHERN ROUTE (from Asia, across Russia and Ukraine to Slovakia and other EU countries) used mainly by inhabitants of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even some post-Soviet republics such as Moldavia, Georgia and Ukraine.

(3) For instance invitations, spa stays, applications for study stays, setting up businesses and holidays.

(4) In the second half of 2011 an inflow of the migrants from the Arab countries of the Northern Africa was gradually decreasing.

(5) The volume of planned income is stated by the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic.

(6) Concordance between the number of applications and approvals for the use of information and technical means in 2011 was confirmed by the District Court in Bratislava.

(7) This concerns live cases or cases in which 30 day evaluation period did not expire.