For You
SIS 2014 Annual Report
Bratislava, June 2015
- Introduction
- SIS strategic focus
- Security
- Counter-terrorism
- Security measures during the Winter Olympic Games and the Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi
- Illegal migration
- Counter-espionage
- Combatting organised crime
- Defence industry product trading, proliferation and the security of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials
- Extremism
- Pseudo-religious groupings
- Issue of socially-excluded communities
- Protection of classified information and clearances for customers
- Cyberspace protection
- Economy
- Corruption and cronyism
- Inefficient management of state and municipality-owned assets
- Customs, tax and financial frauds
- Threats to the financial system of the Slovak Republic
- Energy security of Slovakia
- Outlook of gas and oil transit and supplies to Slovakia
- Foreign politics
- Ukraine
- the Russian Federation
- Belarus
- the Western Balkans
- Assessment of security risks for the Westerners in chosen countries in Asia and Africa
- Cooperation with state bodies and notification duty
- Intelligence products for customers
- State of affairs, basic activities and SIS oversight
- Personnel matters
- Basic indicators
- Technical and material supplies state of affairs and SIS budget spending
- Budget spending
- Information-technical means and telecommunication secrecy
- Cooperation between SIS and foreign intelligence services
- Legislation and supervision
- Legislation
- Supervision
- Oversight of the legality of SIS activities carried out by the Oversight Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic that oversees the activities of the Slovak Information Service
- A report on the National Security Analytical Centre (NBAC)
- Summary
1. 1. Introduction
The 2014 Annual Report is a follow-up of the 2013 Annual Report of the Slovak Information Service (SIS). It provides information on the status, activities and results achieved in the performance of SIS in 2014. This material also contains information about the activities of the National Security Analytical Centre (NBAC) in 2014 in accordance with its status. The 2014 report also contains three detailed articles for the general public regarding the security measures adopted during the Winter Olympic Games and the Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi, outlook of gas and oil transit and supplies, and an assessment of security risks for Western citizens in certain countries in Asia and Africa.
SIS guarantees intelligence protection of the state in the security system of the Slovak Republic and actively cooperates with partner intelligence services and international organisations in order to avert security threats to the EU and NATO member-states and to the international community.
By performing intelligence tasks in 2014, SIS positively contributed to the protection of the constitutional system and internal order, state security and protection and enforcement of foreign political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic.
2. SIS strategic focus
2.1 Security
Counter-terrorism
In counter-terrorism the intelligence service recorded no specific security threats to Slovakia or involvement of Slovak citizens in terrorist activities abroad. Slovakia was not listed as a possible target in online Jihadi propaganda.
Security measures during the Winter Olympic Games and the Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi
In the first quarter of 2014 the services listed the XXII Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (7 – 23 February 2014) and 
XI Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi (7 – 16 March 2014) as one of its top priorities as terrorists and extremist groups might find such a high-ranking international sporting event at which sportspeople, politicians and other visitors represented Slovakia to be an interesting target (especially taking the place where the Games were organised into account).
A potential risk of a terrorist attack of Islamist militants from Northern Caucasus planning to present the region of Northern Caucasus as an active Jihadi zone was high. From the security point of view, the service could not have underestimated possible actions of the author(s) of so-called warning emails that had been sent to the Olympic Committees of several countries, including the Slovak Olympic Committee (SOC).
SIS helped adopt security measures aiming mainly to protect the delegates of SOC and the Slovak Paralympic Committee (SPC), constitutional authorities and Slovak citizens planning to visit the Winter Olympic Games and the Winter Paralympic Games and eliminate relating potential security threats in Slovakia.
The service monitored the security situation in the region where the Games were organised, including the whole region of Northern Caucasus as well as foreign terrorist activities in the world that could potentially affect the security situation in Sochi.
At that time the service analysed and assessed warning emails that had been sent to the official email addresses of SOC. The author(s) of the emails warned about ongoing preparations for terrorist attacks on sportspeople in Sochi. Identical email messages had been sent to other national Olympic Committees as well as the International Olympic Committee. The threat listed in the email message turned out to be a false one.
The service subsequently forwarded intelligence products containing analytical assessment of the security situation in Sochi and the relating potential risks to its customers.
Through a press release presented also at the website of the service, SIS recommended the Slovak citizens wishing to vising the Games in Sochi a set of rules in order to decrease the level of potential security risks for Slovak visitors of the Games during their stay in Sochi and to mitigate the number of potential conflict situations.
The adopted security measures and a pro-active approach in communication with national and international partners contributed to the security of Slovak sporting teams and Slovak visitors in Sochi.
In the assessed period SIS adopted preventive security measures during the preparations of important social events organised in Slovakia as well as during the events themselves.
In 2014 the service intensified the level of assessing potential threats relating to a significant increase of the activities of Jihadi organisations in Syria (at the end of June 2014 also in Iraq) mainly as a result of the successes of the Jihadi organisation the Islamic State (IS) and its increasing popularity among European Muslim communities. The increased interest of the European volunteers from Muslim communities to participate in Jihad, especially with IS, significantly contributed to the increased level of the terrorist threat in Europe, mainly in the countries with a high number of volunteers who pose high/extreme security risk upon their return – these returnees have gained direct combat experience, experienced violence, established contacts with other Jihadists and have been strongly radicalised.
Illegal migration
Illegal migration to Slovakia through the Ukrainian-Slovak border (outer Schengen border) was one of the intelligence priorities in 2014 after the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine had broken out.
In this context the intelligence service kept informing its customers through several intelligence products about the developing trends of illegal migration from Ukraine, state of migration pressure of people coming from third countries from Ukraine, level of protection of the Ukrainian-Slovak border, specific activities of the international trafficking networks and local organisers of illegal migration on both sides of the state border, and possible cooperation between some Ukrainian traffickers and Slovak traffickers.
The intelligence service also focused on the risks of increased migration of Ukrainian citizens to Slovakia or EU resulting from a difficult security situation in the east of Ukraine. It was recorded Ukrainian citizens had violated the visa regime in order to enter to or stay in Slovakia.
The service notified of other cross-border illegal activities carried out by criminal groups paralelly with trafficking as well as participation of the members of the Slovak security forces in the mentioned activity.
Counter-espionage
In the assessed period there were attempts of several foreign intelligence services to infiltrate central bodies of the state administration, security forces and to affect the general opinion. The service recorded an increased level of activities in economic, scientific and military fields as well as in information technologies and industrial espionage.
Relating to the increasing tensions between the Russian Federation and the West and mainly due to the conflict in Ukraine, the level of activities of the Russian intelligence services in all NATO and EU countries increased.
Within counter-espionage protection, SIS was successfully developing cooperation with partner intelligence services joined in NATO and EU as well as with some Asian countries.
Combatting organised crime
Within the area of organised crime, SIS focused on collecting information on illegal activities of the most powerful domestic and foreign organised groups profiting mainly from illegal activities linked with excise tax (alcohol, tobacco and mineral oil frauds) and excessive VAT deductions. In the assessed period the service was providing its products containing information about the attempts of criminals to infiltrate the state administration, police force and military.
Regarding the transnational organised crime activities in Slovakia, SIS repeatedly collected intelligence on active Balkan and Russian-speaking organised groups. The Balkan groups are mostly involved in drug business and the Russian-speaking groups in people trafficking and smuggling of goods through the Ukrainian-Slovak border. In relation to drug crime, the service collected and forwarded intelligence on transnational drug trade, producers and distributors of drugs, mostly of methamphetamine and marijuana. Regarding the international trade with drugs such as cocaine or heroin, mostly the ethnic Albanians, Macedonians, Serbs, Croats and Turks were involved in. In the recent years the level of participation of Vietnamese gangs in the production of and trading with drugs has been increasing. In 2014 SIS collected and forwarded several intelligence products on the activities of Slovak citizens and persons who had been granted permanent residency in Slovakia originally from the Balkans involved in drug business in Slovakia. We also recorded contacts between the former member of Balkan groups established in Slovakia and some Ukrainian citizens.
Defence industry product trading, proliferation and the security of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials
In 2014 SIS continued monitoring controlled products trading; in accordance with the currently valid legislation, it actively took part in licence issuing process relating to defence industry product trading, products, possession of which is limited due to security reasons, and dual-use goods. The service also provided its stands regarding the requests of the Slovak state bodies relating to the international sanctions.
Exports of defence industry products to sensitive regions is a priority of the intelligence service; we aim to identify the supplies possibly delivered to embargoed entities or entities incompatible with the security and foreign interests of Slovakia, EU and NATO. The service was monitoring the activities of certain risk individuals and entities involved in trading with defence industry products (including some members of crime groups).
SIS also focused on the activities of foreign trade companies participating in public procurement in Slovakia relating to purchases of defence industry products.
The service monitored the security of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in Slovakia.
Extremism
Compared to 2013 no significant changes occurred on the extremist scene (the focus and number of adherents). In spite of the fact the right-wing extremists (XRW) including radical football fans supported public protests of civic activists at the end of 2013, there was almost no interest to support such protests in 2014. Upon the intelligence collected SIS recorded public violent the number of activities of the main representatives of Slovak XRW scene decreased.
Activities of the left-wing extremists (XLW) in Slovakia were insignificant in 2014. The service did not record increase of the member base. Their activities were mostly carried out in virtual space and were mostly reactions to the activities of XRWs.
Pseudo-religious groupings
Just like in previous years, in 2014 the service focused on destructive sects and pseudo-religious groupings in Slovakia.
SIS also focused on the continuing attempts of certain sects to infiltrate the education process of children and the youth at schools by distributing leaflets.
Issue of socially-excluded communities
In the assessed period SIS recorded a continuous manifestation of negative views of a part of the majority society targeting the Roma population mostly shared through social networks on the internet by Slovak XRWs on purpose.
Protection of classified information and clearances for customers
In 2014 SIS contributed to the security clearance process conducted by the National Security Authority, the Military Intelligence and the Police Force. Information concerning security credibility of individuals and entrepreneurs was provided to the customers in accordance with Act 215/2004 Coll. on the protection of classified information that changes and supplements certain acts as subsequently amended.
By providing stands, SIS participated in the process of assessing credibility of persons cleared upon requests of the Office of Private Security Services of the Presidium of the Police Force and Regional Offices of the Police Force in compliance with the Act 473/2005 Coll. on providing services in the area of private security that amends and supplements certain acts (Act on Private Security); further, by providing stands upon requests of the Transport Office (Division of Civil Aviation) in compliance with the Act 143/1998 Coll. on civil aviation (Aviation Act) that amends and supplements certain acts as subsequently amended. SIS also provided stands to the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic according to the Act 392/2011 Coll. on defence industry product trading that amends and supplements certain acts relating to the requests of companies for trading and mediating business involving defence industry products.
Cyberspace protection
The Slovak Information Service warned relevant bodies about several vulnerabilities of IT systems of some state bodies. SIS proposed the involved state bodies to adopt active countermeasures and, in several cases, provided support for solving these issues - mainly through expert consultations. Case studies received from foreign partners were adopted as measures against cyberattacks in cooperation with the Unit for Solving Computer Incidents (CSIRT.SK).
2.2 Economy
Corruption and cronyism
In this area SIS focused especially on discovering corruption activities of representatives of state and local administration relating to public procurement, state subsidies, EU subsidies, issuing certificates and licences and relating to adopted decisions of the bodies of financial administration and justice.
In the assessed period the service informed its customers on suspected corruption and cronyism relating to approving and drawing of EU subsidies.
Several suspected cases of corruption were recorded in financial administration.
Regarding the activity of some customs offices, the service warned abound suspected corruption behaviour of several employees of state administration who abused their authority and accepted bribes from illegal traders with alcohol, tobacco products and fuels and from Ukrainian tobacco smugglers.
Inefficient management of state and municipality-owned assets
In the given period SIS collected intelligence pointing to a suspicion that some state-interest companies had caused harm to Slovak economic interests. Suspected cases of inefficient management and handling of state assets related especially to important state construction contracts and drawing subsidies from the state and EU funds were recorded.
SIS informed its customers about findings relating to the most important investments in energy sector. Regarding the drawing of EU funds, the customers were informed about suspected and inefficient handling of funds for flood control systems as well as about manipulated public procurement of an order financed through the EU funds and state budget. SIS also pointed to a possible drawing of subsidies by companies probably linked with one of the most powerful crime groups.
Customs, tax and financial frauds
In the assessed period collecting information on suspected tax frauds was one of the priorities of the service. Mostly these tax frauds related to illegal claims of excessive VAT deductions, corporate income tax and VAT tax evasion, and excise tax frauds.
Regarding tax frauds with highly-taxable goods, intelligence about an organised group importing mineral oils declared for other use than fuel was collected. A certain part of the imported mineral oils was sold in Slovakia; the purchasers distributed it further illegally or it was used as diesel fuel with no excise tax and VAT paid.
VAT frauds within intra-Community supplies of goods relating to trading with agricultural and food commodities, fossil fuels and other commodities carried out by a chain of traders whose activities form an intricate network of companies that issue invoices among themselves for fictitious supplies (no real business and supplies take place) were recorded. The aim of these businesses is profiting from so-called VAT refunds that one of such companies applies for; at the same time one of the supplying companies liable for VAT does not pay the tax.
Threats to the financial system of the Slovak Republic
In 2014 the service collected intelligence on the distribution of (most probably) forged EURO banknotes and the activities of the members of organised groups who had illegally collected money from banks. We also recorded a suspected attempt to provide false bank guarantees delivered to a Slovak branch of a bank and suspected insurance frauds.
Energy security of Slovakia
In the area of energy security SIS focused predominantly on the area of stability of energy supplies to Europe taking the economic interests of Slovakia, mainly in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, into account. The service forwarded several analytical assessments to its customers. SIS also informed about the issue of diversification of oil and gas supplies in the neighbouring countries.
Throughout 2014 the events in Ukraine and the Russian Federation could have potentially affected energy security of Slovakia to a significant extent. In the context of foreign economic relations of Slovakia SIS analysed economic impact for Central Europe relating to strategic energy projects.
Under the issue of foreign economic relations the situation in a Ukrainian military-industrial facility was also analysed.
Outlook of gas and oil transit and supplies to Slovakia
The Russian Federation had been attempting to redirect the transit of natural gas to the new pipeline South Stream outside Ukraine (and thus outside Slovakia) for several years; however, in the end, the project was not marked with success – the project was cancelled and the new project was presented: Turkish Stream.
Once the current contracts expire at the end of 2019, Gazprom declares it will redirect whole transit of gas outside Ukraine and to the new pipeline. However, it will be very difficult to realise the presented idea.
So far only the memorandum of understanding has been signed between Gazprom and the Turkish company Botas in which both companies agree on elaborating a feasibility study. Intergovernmental Turkish-Russian agreement, project consortium, licences and permits laying down the pipeline at the Turkish part of the Black Sea bed, etc. are missing.
The first pipeline (capacity 16 bn. m3 of gas annually) could supply Turkey. The gas transported to Turkey through Ukraine and the Balkans would not affect the transit in Slovakia.
Turkey is trying to maximise profits: it is refusing to finance the undersea construction of the Turkish Stream pipeline and requests a 20 % discount of the gas price transited through the new pipeline.
In the current situation it is expected Gazprom will probably lay down at least one pipeline as it has already invested billions of euros into preparations for building South Stream at the Russian coast; moreover, the contract for supply of pipes for USD 1.5 bn. was also signed. The constructor of the pipeline – the Italian company Saipem – signed a contract for laying pipes worth EUR 2.4 bn. and Gazprom paid the company EUR 25 million each month for idle time. Due to the large amount of works ordered and the fact most pipes were already constructed, at least one pipeline is expected to be built.
One pipeline supplying Turkey totalling EUR 3.5 bn. and possible another pipeline with the capacity of 16 bn. m3 annually for supplying gas to Greece and further west is expected to be constructed.
Collected intelligence points to the fact around 16 – 32 bn. m3 of Ukrainian transit will be redirected annually (not 63 bn. m3 as the Russians declared) but possibly not before 2019.
On contrary to gas, Russia has much wider possibilities to redirect oil outside Ukraine and Slovakia. It could use the existing oil pipelines or naval terminals. So far there has been no intelligence pointing to a possibility Russia is preparing for such step; in time when there is abundance of oil, this is very improbable.
2.3 Foreign politics
Ukraine
The turbulent development in Ukraine in 2014 was one of the priorities of intelligence and analytical activities of the service in the area of foreign politics.
SIS informed its customers about the political and security situation in the country stressing the importance of information about the processes on the Ukrainian political scene and information on worsening of the social-economic and security situation in the country. In the context of the annex of Crimea by the Russian Federation, SIS focused on the breaches of the international law, activities of the separatists in the eastern part of the country that escalated into the armed conflict, proclamation of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics as well as influence of external actors on the escalation of the situation in Ukraine.
SIS paid close attention to the preparations and the results of the presidential elections and its impact on further internal political development (with Poroshenko as the president) as well as political processes relating to the early parliamentary elections.
SIS also paid attention to the wider geopolitical context of the Ukrainian crisis, e.g. how it affected the situation in Transnistria and possible difficult aspects that could affect the signing of the Association Agreement between Moldova and EU and the impact on the development of the situation in Central Asia.
the Russian Federation
SIS was monitoring the development of the internal and foreign politics of the Russian Federation affected by the attempts to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence and the resulting security risks. Endangering energy security of Slovakia was, in this context, an important aspect.
The events in Ukraine quickened the process of systematic strengthening of the conservative power on Russian internal political scene as well as the implementation of other regulatory and control tools of political and economic development.
SIS regularly assessed the activities of Russia in the south-eastern parts of Ukraine where Russia actively supported separatist attempts in order to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence. Besides using non-military means of pressure, the internal political situation allowed the hard core of the conservatives close to Putin to promote decisions on a possible use of power when dealing with Ukraine.
Belarus
The service monitored and assessed the situation in Belarus, focusing especially on the effects of the Ukrainian conflict on the internal political situation in the country and its relations with foreign countries. SIS informed about the attempts of the president Lukashenka to improve relations with the West and to restore mutual economic cooperation in order not only to decrease the dependence on Russia but also to secure a better position for negotiations with Russia. This attempt, however, was not transformed into actions. Closeness of the economies of both states and tolerance of Lukashenka’s power practices meant Russia remained a privileged and dominant partner of Belarus.
the Western Balkans
SIS monitored the situation in the Western Balkans - the integration attempts of the states and their continuous difficulties relating especially to the unresolved issues in interethnic relations, critical economic situation of the states and their citizens, as well as difficulties with omnipresent corruption, organised crime and the increase of radical Islam. Sporadic security incidents mostly had ethnic or criminal background.
Regarding the situation in Serbia the service monitored the early parliamentary elections (March 2014) and analysed its possible impact on future foreign political ambitions of the country.
In Kosovo the service monitored the situation in the context of the early parliamentary elections in June 2014 and assessed its impact on the internal political stability and security and the Kosovo-Serbian dialogue.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) SIS focused on the social unrests of February 2014. Fights among individual political parties prior to the elections deepened political instability in the country and made the functioning of the government difficult.
In Macedonia SIS especially monitored the ethnic tensions between the majority of the Macedonians and the minority of the Albanians that remained the most severe security threat. We also focused on the presidential and early parliamentary elections of April 2014.
The service paid attention to Montenegro, especially in the context of its future accession to NATO. Due to the Ukrainian crisis the country has come closer to NATO; however, insufficient reforms in the security sector remained problematic.
Areas of crises and conflicts
One of the priorities within political and security situation in foreign SIS paid attention to was the assessment of the situation in the Middle East, Africa and some Asian countries that could affect the security of citizens and interests of the Slovak Republic in these areas. Special attention was given to popular holiday destinations for Slovak citizens and countries individual tourists travel to and countries where Slovak citizens (e.g. in humanitarian missions) were present.
SIS focused on the countries of the southern Mediterranean where the security situation was affected by the decaying authoritarian regimes after the so-called Arab Spring, fights among the newly-established political powers and bad economic and social situation. SIS paid close attention to the treats of terrorist attacks targeting foreigners.
Assessment of security risks for the Westerners in chosen countries in Asia and Africa
The level of risk in individual countries depended on individual conditions in each country. In Egypt and Tunisia the risk arose from political conflicts and bad socio-economic situation that resulted in an increased number of violent public protests that temporarily worsened the security situation. The demonstrations focused primarily on internal problems of the countries and did not present a direct threat to foreign visitors (only if they did not follow the rule to avoid attendance of public gatherings and visiting risk locations).
Another aspect SIS was taking into account when assessing the level of risk of countries was the existence of local terrorist and extremist organisations and their activities targeting economic interests of their governments. Tourism is a sensitive point in this context as income from tourism is significant for gross domestic product in some Middle East and North Africa countries. A possible attack on tourists would decrease income to state budgets which in turn would increase the risk of terrorist incidents targeting hotels or locations visited by foreign tourists mainly in Egypt, Tunisia and in Jordan at the coast of the Red Sea.
In some Middle East countries (Yemen, Lebanon, Syria) and in Sahel in sub-Saharan Africa (south of Algeria and Tunisia, Mali, Mauretania) where terrorist groups collect money from abductions of the Westerners and cooperate with wide criminal networks, the fact one was a Westerner was a risk factor itself. Such abductions were always connected with a high risk of politically motivated murders if ransom was not paid.
The service assessed threats for personnel of foreign humanitarian and developing organisations, including entities from Slovakia in Southern Sudan. Employees of these organisations faced a possibility they would become victims of the fights around their locations or of a drastically increased level of crime in a country.
Monitoring potential threats for Slovak citizens abroad was an important moment of cooperation between SIS and national and foreign institutions. The service contributed to the assessments of security situation in crisis regions within Temporary Situation Centre of the Slovak Republic. Information exchange on terrorist threats against European citizens also took place with foreign partner services.
In relation with security incidents of Slovak citizens abroad in the past year, the services published a press release on risks linked with so-called adrenaline or adventure tourism in crisis regions, recommended reconsidering travelling to certain risk regions and warned about risk factors one has to take into account when travelling.
One of the priorities of the focus of the service was the civil conflict in Syria. Instability and decline of the state power in northern and eastern parts of the country resulted in the division of the country into cantons administered by various actors (al-Assad’s regime, armed opposition, the Kurds, radical Islamist groups) without prospect for unification under the central administration any time soon. The situation in Iraq was monitored in the context of the offensive of IS that occupied large areas in the northern part of the country in June 2014. The service pointed to an increased risk of terrorist attacks targeting Western targets in the capital and exchanged information with partner services about possible threats to European embassies.
Much attention was given to the issue of returnees from Iraq and Syria. These persons completed their radicalisation process by having participated in a violent conflict and present an extreme risk of terrorist attacks for European targets. Besides this, returnees continue to radicalise and recruit new fighters in European countries.
The service assessed information on a possible fragmentation of Iraq and its geopolitical impacts in the Middle East. It is clear the activities of the aggressive IS harms the fragility of this historically-sensitive region – in future, this would probably result in more outbreaks of armed violence.
In Lebanon the service especially monitored the worsening of the security situation in the capital Beirut. SIS continued elaborating regular assessments regarding the talks between Iran and the West about the Iranian nuclear programme that also presents a threat to Europe. An important step forward in solving the Iranian nuclear issue resulted in the implementation of a temporary agreement in which Iran and the P5+1 group agreed to follow the obligations in order to solve the stalemate. In conformity with the agreement, some activities of the nuclear programme and lowering sanctions created conditions for further talks and muted the Iranian and American groups opposing the agreement.
SIS also monitored the escalation of violence in Egypt, especially in the context of possible threats to Western interests and interests of Slovakia, including the security of Slovak citizens in the country. In the assessed period SIS monitored general security situation in Cairo and increased tensions before the presidential elections in May. The elections were not marked with significant security incidents; however, low turnout and possible vote rigging affected the elections in a negative way. Attention was also given to the improving relations between Egypt and Russia in the areas of military equipment, energy and trade and its possible impact on the alliance between Egypt and the West.
At the end of 2014 the service warned about the escalation of domestic political tensions in Libya. In this part of Africa IS became intensively active as it had set up hundreds of training camps in the eastern part of the country. At the same time the fights among several Islamist groups broke out.
Regarding the prognosis of the development of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, the proclamations of IS about the expansion to other areas cannot be underestimated. The Islamic State has a real potential to endanger internal political situation in Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or countries in Africa by utilising violence.
3. Cooperation with state bodies and notification duty
SIS is given tasks within its scope of authority under Section 2 of the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic no. 46/1993 Coll. on Slovak Information Service as subsequently amended (Act no. 46/1993 Coll.) by the Security Council of the Slovak Republic in writing. The Council is an advisory body to the government of the Slovak Republic; it is chaired by the Prime Minister, and the director of the service participates in its meetings. The director of the service orally informs the members of the Council of the assessment of the security situation in the Slovak Republic and the world. Within the Council the Committee on Intelligence Services Cooperation discusses issues relating to the intelligence services in the Slovak Republic as well as security issues. The SIS director is a member of the Committee and the Prime Minister is a Chair. The director presents the members of the Committee information on intelligence priorities and up-to-date intelligence.
Committee information on intelligence priorities and up-to-date intelligence. According to the Act on Slovak Information Service (46/1993 Coll.), SIS uses official service contacts with Slovak state bodies, institutions and offices for collecting information and supporting materials that might lead to clarification required for the fulfilment of the tasks as stated in the Act. SIS members establish official service contacts upon the director’s approval or authorisation.
In 2014 SIS cooperated with the following bodies:
Ministry of Interior – the Office of Private Security Services of the Presidium of the Police Force,
Ministry of Defence – Military Intelligence,
District Court in Bratislava,
General Prosecutor’s Office,
National Security Authority – Department of information security of encrypted protection of information and electronic signature.
Intelligence products for customers
In the Strategic Focus areas SIS forwarded 394 intelligence products to its customers – 180 (46 %) relating to security, 97 (24 %) relating to economy and 117 (30 %) relating to foreign politics.
Table 1: Intelligence products from 1 Jan 2014 to 31 Dec 2014
4. State of affairs, basic activities and SIS oversight
4.1 Personnel matters
Basic indicators
As at 31 December 2014, the total of SIS members accounted for more than 82.35 % of the planned state; related to the last year, the number is more or less identical. Personnel structure according to the basic demographics remained unchanged when compared to previous years.
As at 31 December 2014, the total of SIS members accounted for more than 82.35 % of the planned state; related to the last year, the number is more or less identical. Personnel structure according to the basic demographics remained unchanged when compared to previous years.
Figure: SIS members according to gender, age, education and state service
4.2 Technical and material supplies state of affairs and SIS budget spending
Budget spending
Draft of the budget of the budget chapter of SIS for 2013 was discussed and approved in the National Council of the Slovak Republic in the Act no. 473/2013 on state budget for 2014 within the limits submitted by the government of the Slovak Republic. Subsequently the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic announced final indicators for SIS – total income accounted for EUR 162.000 and total expenses for the Information Activity programme accounted for EUR 42.944.042 (ordinary expenses totalled EUR 41.948.042 and capital expenses totalled EUR 996.000).
In 2014 the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic issued five budget measures affecting the total amount of expenses of the service.
In the area of technical and material supplies SIS investments were mainly used for an update of the information-communication system, cyberintelligence, update of intelligence equipment and purchase of devices for encrypted protection of information.
As the amount of resources allocated from the total limit of expenses for 2014 as capital expenses was not sufficient to update information technologies in order to meet the required level of technical, communication and information capability, SIS is not able to function without an increased limit of capital expenses. The state is critical especially in the context of the tasks of the services relating to the upcoming presidency of Slovakia in the Council of the European Union. In the area of protection of information systems and processed intelligence, it will be necessary to reach a new level of protection acceptable by international intelligence bodies. Not solving the matter urgently might result in technical and information collapse of the service and its incapability to fulfil its basic tasks that could result in the loss of the credibility of not only the service but also the Slovak Republic itself.
Common expenses were mostly used for obligatory and contractual payments, securing operations defined by the law, removing consequences of state of emergency of morally and technically outdated information and communication systems and physically worn-out premises.
SIS performed tasks in the technical and material supplies area in accordance with the generally binding and internal regulations taking the need to decrease expenses through adopted measures into account. SIS drew finances from the state budget with the purpose given, efficiency and economy on mind.
4.3 Information-technical means and telecommunication secrecy
In 2014 SIS submitted 256 requests to use information-technical means, 13 requests were rejected. Out of 230 uses of information-technical means, the aims and purposes as defined by law were reached in 237 uses of information-technical means; in 6 cases it were not.
The use of information-technical means by SIS is fully in compliance with the Act no. 46/1993 Coll. and the Act no. 166/2003 Coll. on the protection of privacy against unauthorised use of information-technical means amending and supplementing certain Acts (Act on the protection against interception) as subsequently amended.
Technical means applied along with strict organisation and control measures guarantee the legality of ITM use and exclude the possibility of unauthorised access into the monitoring system or data storage and archives.
Technical means applied along with strict organisation and control measures guarantee the legality of ITM use and exclude the possibility of unauthorised access into the monitoring system or data storage and archives.
Table 2: Number of requests to collect information containing telecommunication secrecy elaborated by SIS and forwarded to the District Court in Bratislava and the number of approved/rejected requests
4.4 Cooperation between SIS and foreign intelligence services
Bilateral cooperation focused on strengthening mutual relations, broadening the existing activities in operations and analyses. Currently SIS cooperates with 81 intelligence service on a bilateral level.
Main topics of bilateral cooperation last year were counter-terrorism, counter-extremism, proliferation of dual use materials, illegal defence industry products trading, illegal migration, organised crime and activities of foreign intelligence services. There was also an extensive exchange of information on the current development in Ukraine and in the areas of crises.
Cooperation on multilateral level and with groups such as Club de Berne (CdB), Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), FORUM, Middle European Conference (MEC) and Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC) continued as planned and in compliance with the strategic focus of the service (regular meetings of heads of services (HoS), workgroups, workshops, etc.), According to the focus of individual platforms, SIS also paid attention to countering terrorism, extremism, proliferation of dual use materials, illegal defence industry products trading, illegal migration, organised crime and activities of foreign intelligence services. Cooperation also focused on monitoring of the situation in risk and conflict regions (Iran, Syria, and Ukraine) as well as exchange of experience of individual services and exchange on cost-cutting measures. New topics in the fields of protection of classified information and cyberspace were also opened.
Besides traditional areas within CdB, the cooperation focused on enhancing cooperation with the services SIS jointly organises workgroups with.
In 2014, the programme of CIC NATO focused on the finalisation of the intelligence reform of NATO and improvement of cooperation between civilian and military intelligence services within NATO HQ, aim of which is to adequately support the decision-making process within NATO.
Table 3: International cooperation
4.5 Legislation and supervision
Legislation
Within the area of legislation, the office of SIS cooperates with ministries, other central state authorities and state bodies. In 2014 SIS commented on 101 documents intended for interdepartmental consultation and raised 14 points of order. The aim of the comments was to draw proposer’s attention to issues arising from real life application and develop a legal base for proper and effective performance of SIS legal tasks.
Within interdepartmental consultations, fundamental comments were discussed during consultation procedures. Some comments SIS had presented were implemented in respective materials.
Supervision
Under the supervision of the state, 23 planned inspections were conducted in the areas of security and protection of health, security of technical devices, fire protection and state health inspection.
4.6 Oversight of the legality of SIS activities carried out by the Oversight Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic that oversees the activities of the Slovak Information Service
The Oversight Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic that oversees the activities of the Slovak Information Service (the Committee) is a parliamentary oversight body and carries out overseeing tasks of the National Council of the Slovak Republic in compliance with the Act no. 46/1993 Coll. as subsequently amended in relation to the legality and lawfulness of SIS activities and thus effectively contributes to maintaining applicable guarantees of legality of the service as a central intelligence body of the Slovak Republic.
In accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, this ensures the Committee the right to legally carry out oversight of generally binding regulations backed by the legal power of the Constitution, fundamental laws and the law. It is a tool that maintains the principles of power division and counter-balance. Oversight of the legality of SIS activities carried out by the Committee ensures its legal and legitimate activities - despite the fact (in order to carry out legal defined tasks in accordance with Article 2(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic) it is necessary to observe strict legal limits of the scope of the civil intelligence service or taking the legal regulations defined in international treaties and agreements the Slovak Republic is bound to into account.
In accordance with the currently valid legal regulation the parliamentary oversight body carries out ex post oversight of the legality and lawfulness of SIS activities. To perform the oversight power, the director general of SIS is legally required to present a set of documents to the oversight body, i.e. the Code of Practice, budget, SIS annual report, and a specified number of internal regulations approved by the SIS director that lists the scope and organisation structure of the service, requirements for the use of special powers, and record-keeping and service details of SIS officers. Members of the parliamentary oversight body are entitled to enter secured and protected premises of the service in order to carry out physical inspection of such premises.
If the Committee discovers the Act on SIS has been breached, the oversight body is legally required to inform the National Council and the General Prosecutor’s Office as a constitutional authority that protects the rights and interests of natural persons, legal entities and the state. As it is a body that presents the President of the Slovak Republic proposals for appointment or dismissal of SIS directors; the oversight body may also decide whether the Government of the Slovak Republic will be informed. Moreover, the National Council of the Slovak Republic discusses the annual report submitted by the director of the service at least once a year.
Besides the given oversight tools, the National Council of the Slovak Republic pays attention to the use of special powers used for clandestine collection of information, use of which (by SIS and other authorised state bodies) might infringe privacy rights guaranteed by the Constitution without prior consent of these persons. Currently the Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on Defence and Security is authorised to oversee the use of these special powers.
In 2014 the Oversight Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic that oversees the activities of the Slovak Information Service and the Slovak Information Service closely discussed the application of proper legal tools for ensuring the parliamentary oversight of SIS activities as well as securing the ad hoc inspections initiated by the Committee members or Slovak citizens and upon specific requests of the Committee that SIS was asked to liaise with.
In relation to the exercise of the standard scope of legal rights of the parliamentary oversight body, the director of SIS presented the Tasks and Aims of the National Security and Analytical Centre of SIS to the body. In relation to SIS budget spending, the Committee discussed the Report on Budget Spending: the state budget Chapter 09 – SIS for 2013 and a draft of the final budget of the state budget Chapter 09 – SIS for 2013.
The Committee was presented SIS stands regarding information presented in filings, in which persons listed their rights and interests protected by law had been violated or endangered by alleged anti-Constitutional activities of the service. Upon having acquainted with the factual and legal states of individual appeals of natural entities and the stand of the director of the service as well as the course of action adopted by SIS, the Committee resolved the service obliged its generally binding regulations and in no way it violated or endangered the rights and interests protected by law of these natural entities.
In 2014 the members of the Committee focused on the draft of the new legal regulation concerning intelligence services in the Slovak Republic. The draft was a subject of several expert discussions that resulted in amendments of some provisions. The members of the Committee focused especially on provisions relating to independent oversight of the activities of intelligence services in order to support the proposed strengthening of the mechanism that complies with current international and European standards.
The Committee further paid attention to abiding internal legal regulations and budget spending.
Applying oversight tools for carrying out oversight of SIS activities in 2014 can be considered above-standard, especially taking the scope and openness of the communication into consideration. From social and political points of view, such oversight contributes to strengthened legal assurance that SIS is a modern intelligence service in a democratic state, to increased credibility in the society and to the role of the provider of intelligence protection of the Slovak Republic and its citizens. SIS is ready to liaise efficiently and thus apply the right of the National Council of the Slovak Republic to oversight the Service.
5. A report on the National Security Analytical Centre (NBAC)
The National Security Analytical Centre (NBAC) was established with the aim to make interdepartmental information exchange on security incidents and threats to the Slovak Republic and its citizens more efficient. The main task of the centre is to assess received information on incidents, events and phenomena and fuse all available information on threats to the security of the Slovak Republic and its citizens through members and employees of state bodies servicing in NBAC. In the assessed period NBAC continued to intensify the given activities. To the recipients NBAC forwarded an analysis on the development of the security situation in chosen Asian countries, an identification of security risks resulting from the crisis situation in Ukraine in the bordering region of Zakarpattia; the centre further dealt with Slovak citizens in risk regions and analysed the risk of misusing Slovak citizens for illegal issuance of Schengen visas by foreign citizens and attempts to circumvent international sanctions. NBAC also summarised security risks resulting from the spread of the Ebola virus. Due to the negative development of the security situation in several regions of the world with links to Slovakia and its interests, NBAC focused on analysing security risks of returnees who had been involved in armed conflicts. NBAC also informed its customers about cyberattacks targeting EU information systems where classified information is stored.
Through cooperation with state bodies within the centre as well as other state bodies and organisations, NBAC elaborated several proposals for strengthening and improving interdepartmental cooperation in the areas of assessing Schengen visa applications, security incidents in cyberspace and use of communication systems in classified regime with foreign partners.
Upon the national mandate given by the Chair of the Board of the Centre – the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic, NBAC applied for a membership in the informal platform (Madrid Group) that joints national bodies and counterterrorist centres of EU member states that counter terrorism and analyse security threats. The group was established in January 2010; currently 23 bodies participate in its regular meetings. NBAC participated in the meeting of the heads of the counterterrorist centres and national coordinators for countering terrorism of EU member states; within the Madrid Group NBAC presented its aims and its focus. The membership in the Madrid Group brought intensified bilateral information exchange between the centre and partner centres. Bilateral cooperation was carried out in compliance with the 2016 outlook that aims to establish direct links between the centre and foreign partners through foreign business trips and visits.
In the given period two meetings of the Board of the Centre focusing on coordination of the activity of the bodies joint under NBAC, assessment of security situation based on notifications received by the centre, discussion on improving activities of the centre and evaluating the level of terrorist threat in Slovakia were organised.
Within NBAC the 12th meeting of the Special Oversight Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic that oversees the activities of the Slovak Information Service at which the members of the committee were acquainted with the aims and focus of the centre was organised.
NBAC participated in the Expert Group on coordination of information exchange and analyses and cooperation in the area of counterterrorism established with Committee of the Security Council of the Slovak Republic that coordinates intelligence services.
In compliance with the Code of Practice, NBAC participated in the increased monitoring of the security situation in Slovakia during top political events and other mass events of international significance in Slovakia, for instance during the international conference Globsec or the planned NATO military exercises in Slovakia.
In relation with the participation of Slovak citizens in international events outside Slovakia or in connection with the events abroad that could potentially endanger Slovakia and its citizens, NBAC participated in the activities that assessed security threats during the Winter Olympic Games and the Winter Paralympic Games and during the escalation of the security situation in Crimea and in Ukraine.
NBAC and the professional capacity of individual bodies participating at the work of the centre were also used to organise lectures for state administration employees focused on the development of the security and political situation in the Middle East and North Africa countries and a potential of using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorism. Further, upon the requests of several state bodies NBAC provided lectures on explaining the tasks and aims of the centre. As these lectures were positively received, the centre is planning to continue providing these educational services.
Upon the experience gained in 2013 and due to the recorded benefits of the centre for interdepartmental cooperation in the field of early identification of threats, SIS increased staffing of the centre (not affecting the budget of the service).
6. Summary
In 2014 within its competence and within its authorities, SIS was collecting, storing, assessing and providing authorised legal recipients with information, thus fulfilling its tasks in the intelligence and contributing to the protection of the constitutional order of the Slovak Republic, to the security of the state and to the protection and the enforcement of foreign political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic.
* All photographs from the archive of TASR.