For You


SIS 2015 Annual Report

Bratislava, June 2016
  1. Foreword
  2. SIS strategic focus
    1. Security
    2. Counter-terrorism
    3. Illegal migration
    4. Counter-espionage
    5. Organized crime
    6. Defense industry products, proliferation, nuclear equipment and materials safety
    7. Extremism
    8. Pseudoreligious groups
    9. Socially marginalized communities
    10. Protection of classified information and vetting for customers
    11. Cyberspace
    12. Economy
    13. Corruption and preferential treatment
    14. Inefficient disposition of state and municipality-owned assets
    15. Customs, tax and financial fraud
    16. Threats to the financial system of the Slovak Republic
    17. Foreign economic relations of the Slovak Republic
    18. Foreign politics
    19. Ukraine
    20. Russian Federation
    21. Belarus
    22. Western Balkans
    23. Crisis and conflict regions
    24. Increased terrorist threats to Slovak citizens in tourist destinations
  3. Cooperation with state bodies and notification duty
    1. Intelligence production for customers
  4. State of affairs, basic activities and SIS oversight
    1. Personnel matters
    2. Basic indicators
    3. Budget spending and technical and material provisioning
    4. Information-technical means (ITM) and telecommunications confidentiality
    5. Cooperation with intelligence services from other countries
    6. Legislation and inspection
    7. Legislation
    8. Supervision
  5. A report on the activity of the National Security and Analytical Centre (NBAC)
  6. Summary
  7. 1. Foreword

    This report is a continuation of the Slovak Information Service Annual Report from 2014. It informs about task fulfillment, performance and results of SIS activities in 2015. This document also includes a report on the National Security Analytical Centre's (NBAC) activities in accordance with its Code of Conduct in 2015.

    The report strictly focuses on activities in 2015 and does not describe activities conducted in the first few months of 2016 or any most up-to-date phenomena.

    SIS, as a part of the security system, guarantees intelligence protection of the Slovak Republic. It actively cooperates with partner intelligence services and international organizations in order to protect the international community and to prevent and eliminate security threats in common environment, to which Slovakia belongs together with other member states of the European Union (the EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

    By performing intelligence tasks in 2015, SIS positively contributed to the protection of the constitutional system and internal order, state security and protection and enforcement of foreign political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic.

    2. SIS strategic focus

    2.1 Security


    SIS recorded no immediate terrorist threats against the Slovak Republic or its citizens or foreign policy interests. The service did not have any information about participation of Slovak citizens or residents in terrorist activities. In 2015, SIS focused primarily on monitoring and evaluation of terrorist threats against the EU due to significant increase of terrorist attacks and threats against the West stemming from Islamist radicals, especially the Jihadi organization Daesh (the so-called Islamic State).

    The service provided evaluations to domestic customers regarding the following: the Charlie Hebdo and kosher grocery store attacks in Paris in January 2015; café and Jewish museum attack in Denmark in February 2015, attack on tourists in Bardo National Museum in Tunisia in March 2015; attack on tourists in Tunisian hotel resort in June 2015; attack on the train travelling between Amsterdam and Paris in August 2015; attack on Russian plane in Egypt in October 2015 and simultaneous attacks in Paris in November 2015.

    In this context, SIS analyzed potential terrorist threats to the Slovak Republic and reactions of the risk part of the foreign community living in Slovakia. The most successful attacks in Western countries was inspired by the military successes of Daesh and its intensive media propaganda which resonated in the form of violent activities performed by its followers in the Western world. Therefore, the service informed its customers about media propaganda trends of Daesh and its impact on the risk community of foreigners living in Slovakia.

    Illegal migration

    In the middle of 2015, illegal migration increased in main front-line EU countries (especially Greece, Hungary and Italy). Massive influx of migrants to the EU continued on the so-called Balkan Migration Route in the following months of 2015. The migration wave and related security risks were reflected in intelligence activities of SIS in the second half of 2015. When monitoring illegal migration in 2015, the service focused on assessing security risks related to illegal migrants coming to the EU, primary risks of potential infiltration of people sympathizing with radical and terrorist Islamist organizations into the migration wave, veterans from conflict zones and people who might have committed crimes against humanity in these zones. In the context of migration crisis, SIS also evaluated reactions of right-wing and left-wing extremist groups (in Slovakia and also in the EU), monitored organized crime groups profiting from human smuggling and observed the security situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

    In 2015, the intelligence service informed its customers about activities of criminal groups suspected of facilitating illegal migration of people originating from Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Slovak-Ukrainian border as well as on the route from Hungary to the Slovak Republic.


    SIS was gathering, collecting and evaluating information on foreign services' activities in the Slovak Republic. In the assessed period, there were attempts of several foreign intelligence services to infiltrate central bodies of the state administration and security forces and to influence the public opinion. The service recorded an increased level of their activities in economic, scientific and military fields as well as information technologies and industrial espionage.

    Within counter-espionage protection, SIS was successfully developing cooperation with partner intelligence services joined in NATO and EU as well as with some Asian countries.

    Organized crime

    Economic and drug-related illegal activities have been main sources of income for organized crime groups in the Slovak Republic. Economic crime includes mainly goods smuggling, illegal manufacture and sale of high duty goods and fraud with excessive VAT deductions.

    As to the fight against international organized drug trade, SIS monitors mainly groups whose members are based in or originate from Southeastern or Eastern Europe. Some top members of international organized crime are interested in creating a base in our territory by acquiring a residence permit in Slovakia. This is the reason why these individuals set up companies in the Slovak Republic.

    Last year, SIS informed about several cases of drug manufacturing and distribution. In most cases, the drugs were imported from abroad. Drug smuggling to Europe is becoming more significant on the Balkan route, while some parts of the route cross Slovakia and branch out to target countries in Western Europe to end users. The Slovak Republic is mostly a transit country or a temporary storage for international drug traders. The Ukrainian port Odessa started playing an important role in drug transport, especially heroin, on the Balkan route. There is a high rate of corruption and a possibility to unload drugs coming from South America and West Africa together with goods destined for the EU and to transport them to Bulgaria or Romania. Drugs are further transported to Europe from here.

    Apart from the sale of standard hard drugs (heroin, cocaine), criminal groups are active in the sale of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine. Their manufacture partially decreased in the Slovak Republic thanks to legislative measures (higher penalties). These are mostly imported from neighboring countries. Precursors for these drugs are supplied mainly from China. In 2015, attempts to distribute new types of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances not yet added to the list of banned substances were monitored.

    In connection with violent organized crime and burglaries, SIS informed about possible offenders and facilitators. There was also a case of dangerous threats made to municipal and public administration representatives.

    Like every year, in 2015 SIS collected information about fake vignettes and documents, some of them were used for illegal migration.

    In regard to goods smuggling, SIS acquired information about tobacco products smuggling. In several cases, Ukrainian cigarettes were imported to Slovakia through Hungary.

    Defense industry products, proliferation, nuclear equipment and materials safety

    SIS continued monitoring shops with controlled goods. In accordance with the legislation, it was taking part in the licensing processes related to trade with defense industry products, goods with limited possession for security reasons and dual use items.

    Intelligence attention was primarily dedicated to defense industry products export to sensitive regions and to transit of these products to intermediary countries, aiming to identify deliveries whose end users were among embargoed entities or those deliveries that were in conflict with security or foreign interest of the Slovak Republic, the EU or NATO.

    SIS also monitored the involvement of risk individuals and entities in mediating business with defense industry products, including organized crime members. SIS collected and evaluated information about the so-called expansion firearms, modified from live firearms with reactivation potential.

    This risk was identified in 2014. At the beginning of 2015, a valid legislation in the Slovak Republic enabled deactivation of firearms allowing subsequent reactivation. Since more EU countries had stricter legislation at that time, foreigners started buying expansion weapons in Slovakia on a large scale. Such weapons were detained in connection with Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in Paris in January 2015. SIS, in cooperation with foreign intelligence services, helped identify the origin of these weapons. In the middle of 2015, the risk of possible abuse of expansion firearms led to adoption of the amendment of Act No. 190/2003 on firearms and ammunition that entered into force on July 1, 2015. This Act introduced stricter rules for expansion firearms sale and registration duty. Even after these legislative changes, the legal obligations related to purchase of expansion firearms were not always observed. The service also focused on monitoring of expansion firearms export. Foreign buyers purchased these weapons either directly or through Slovak citizens. In these cases, SIS cooperated with several foreign services that led to detention of risk individuals and weapons abroad.

    SIS also highlighted the need for another amendment of Act No. 190/2003, since a risk of abuse of some types of percussion and Flaubert firearms modified from live firearms allowing reactivation and use of live ammunition existed.


    SIS detected a significant Slovak right-wing extremists' response to migration wave and successful terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015 that was reflected in their agenda. They started presenting anti-migration and anti-Islamic attitudes and fight against multiculturalism more intensively. EU and NATO criticism became one of the main topics. The traditional XRW topic – anti-Roma rhetoric – became secondary under this influence in the second half of 2015.

    In 2015, the service did not detect any strengthening of XLW member base in the Slovak Republic. Their public activities remained insignificant and were mostly manifested online.

    Pseudoreligious groups

    Our intelligence service monitored activities of sects and pseudoreligious communities in the Slovak Republic. The attention shifted to financial profit, psychological manipulation and infiltration into Slovak schools.

    Socially marginalized communities

    SIS collected information about ongoing illegal activities of some Slovak citizens living abroad, especially human trafficking related to prostitution, forced labor and usury. The service detected several cases of sham marriages of Slovak female citizens with citizens of third world countries who became entitled to apply for citizenship in an EU country.

    Protection of classified information and vetting for customers

    The service joined the vetting process of the National Security Authority, Military Intelligence and Police Force. The clients were sent information on security profile of candidates and business persons according to the Protection of Classified Information Act 215/2004 Coll. on protection of classified information as amended ("the Act").

    From March 2015, SIS participated in the process of collecting information related to assessing eligibility of candidates for judicial positions by retrieving information from own databases on behalf of the National Security Authority in accordance with section 75 (1) (e) of the Act.

    The service participated in the vetting of persons under section 14(4) of the Provision of Services in Private Security Act 473/2005 by means of statements issued at the request of the Presidium of the Police Force of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic’s Office for Private Security Services and regional police directorates. It also issued statements at the request of the Transport Office (Civil Aviation Division) when assessing security credibility of persons under section 34(a)(5) of the Civilian Aviation Act 143/1998.

    The service provided statements under section(5)(2, 4) of the Act on Trading in Defense-Industry Products 392/2011 to the Ministry of Economy related to corporate requests for permits to trade (and mediate deals) in defense-industry products.


    SIS collected information about potential cyber threats which could have posed a higher security risk for cybersecurity in the Slovak Republic. In cooperation with CSIRT.SK (Computer Security Incident Response Team Slovakia), SIS worked on a case of harmful software infiltration in some client workstations of Slovak Embassies abroad.

    2.2 Economy

    Corruption and preferential treatment

    Our service recorded several cases of corruption and preferential treatment in public procurement and disposition of state and municipal property, drawing of subsidies from the state budget and EU funds and in activities involving Financial Administration authorities, police, prosecutor's office and courts.

    Corruption and preferential treatment were recorded in several restitution cases.

    SIS also informed about system-wide flaws identified in restitution process which created breeding ground for corruption and suggested measures for elimination.

    SIS informed its clients about efforts of private companies’ representatives to bribe tax collectors in return for illegitimate excessive VAT deductions for companies.

    SIS also informed its clients about illegal influencing of Prosecutor's Office and court decisions.

    Inefficient disposition of state and municipality-owned assets

    SIS recorded cases of inefficient disposition of state and municipality-owned assets related mainly to public contracts, sales of assets and absorption of state subsidies and EU funds.

    The service paid attention to implementation of several significant public construction contracts that were co-financed from EU funds.

    A significant project in the field of energy was also monitored. SIS submitted information about the state of the project and causes of its drawbacks to customers, as well as related risks, such as missing deadlines and exceeding budgets.

    SIS pointed to cases of suspected undermining of financial interests of the state and the EU related to absorption of agricultural subsidies for restructuring projects; absorption of subsidies for agricultural manufacture modernization; construction of sewers and construction of a health-care facility. Most likely after an agreement with suppliers, recipients abused subsidies by paying overpriced invoices or by using subsidies for purpose other than contractually agreed.

    Customs, tax and financial fraud

    In 2015, the service focused on collecting information on tax fraud by organized groups. Most cases were connected to illegal reclaiming of VAT; tax evasion by legal bodies, VAT evasion and fraud on tobacco and alcohol excise duty.

    There were suspected cases of VAT reclaim fraud related to trade with commodities and services. The common factor was a network of companies issuing invoices for fictitious supplies, while the business or the supplies never took place.

    Legal entities registered by strawmen were used for these tax frauds. After a legislative change, there was an increased number of cases of company mergers in order to evade tax duty. In these cases, strawmen of foreign origin acted like owners followed instructions of real owners.

    Threats to the financial system of the Slovak Republic

    The service acquired information about efforts to distribute forged euro banknotes and about foreigners attempting to fraudulently elicit financial means from Slovak citizens.

    Foreign economic relations of the Slovak Republic

    Our particular concern was energy security in terms of energy raw material supply.

    We analyzed stability of gas supplies and reserves in Ukraine intended for transit to Europe. Despite Gazprom's tactics to reduce gas supplies for European customers from September 2014, the reverse flow to Ukraine continued. At the beginning of March 2015, Gazprom was forced to abandon this strategy. The launch of the reverse gas flow through Slovakia to Ukraine significantly decreased Ukraine's dependency on Russian gas supplies.

    In addition, we analyzed Ukraine's solvency, income and expenses of Ukraine's state budget and Ukraine's energy sector including the reliability of distribution routes of energy carriers through the Ukrainian territory.

    SIS also focused on the state and potential of the Ukrainian agriculture sector. At the beginning of 2015, certain doubts arose about food security of the Ukrainian population of 45 million due to the complicated economic situation and armed conflict in eastern parts of the country. A possible production output could result in humanitarian catastrophe. However, the harvest in 2015 confirmed our prognosis and it was only slightly lower than the record-breaking harvest in 2014.

    SIS forecasted the development of foreign reserve assets in Russia in relation to decreased crude oil prices and international sanctions. In connection with Russian economic difficulties, SIS watched the economic situation in Crimea, since its economy depends on subsidies from the Russian state budget.

    In 2015, SIS also evaluated economic aspects of the situation in Greece and its impact and possible future development.

    The service analyzed consequences of the approaching return of Iran to the crude oil world market. The decrease of crude oil prices was caused by slower economic growth in China; expectations of the Iranian return to the market and the fact that those on the supply-side of the market wished to keep their market share even with lower price of this commodity, which is why the production did not decrease in 2015.

    The service took notice of foreign shareholders' intentions of Slovak energy companies and it informed customers about the risk of damaging economic interests of the Slovak republic related to the change of their ownership structure.

    SIS monitored replacement of the owner of a strategically-significant privatized company. It seemed that there was unfavorable situation in the industry, the company was breaking contacts with external companies and planned collective redundancy of key employees.

    2.3.Foreign policy


    The development in Ukraine in 2015 was one of the top intelligence and analytical priorities of SIS regarding foreign policy. SIS informed its customers about political and security situation in the country with an emphasis on risk factors such as armed conflict escalation in the eastern part of the country, growing social tension and increasing protest potential of the public.

    The situation was tense due to inconsistent governing coalition created after early elections in October 2014 and rivalry among political leaders, political parties and oligarchs.

    SIS was continually evaluating the situation in the eastern part of Ukraine (the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic) as well as in other southeastern regions, especially in Odessa and Kharkov region. The service paid attention to the ongoing armed conflict, mobilization problems and increasingly autonomous activities of voluntary battalions including activities of Pravyi Sektor.

    The difficult situation in Ukraine was also reflected in the functioning of the Ukrainian security services. SIS was assessing risk factors related to their operation, such as possible abuse of services for political goals or the influence of oligarchs and organized crime groups over intelligence structures.

    Due to geographical closeness of Ukraine and Slovakia, SIS paid special attention to the situation in the Transcarpathian region, focusing on signals indicating possibility of conflicts as the population is unsatisfied with economic situation, fears mobilization and activities of radical groups.

    SIS informed the Security Council of the Slovak Republic and it presented its assessments to the Special Oversight Committee of the National Council. The presented information was mainly related to the tense situation in gas industry, illegal migration, risk of Ukrainian citizens abusing legal ways of entering the Slovak Republic; reactions of Slovak right-wing extremists and the risk of Slovak volunteers (fighters) returning to Slovakia.

    Russian Federation

    SIS monitored changes of domestic and foreign policies of the Russian Federation, especially its involvement in Ukraine, Syria and propaganda aimed against the West.

    In regard to the domestic policy of RF, SIS focused on risk factors influencing political stability and economic situation in the country. Strengthening power positions of the conservative part of state leadership and its interest in keeping a high level of regulation and control over the situation in the country was a dominant trend. Limiting third sector activities was also part of this trend, especially in case of organizations getting support from abroad which are considered part of the forces ready to organize so-called “color revolutions” in the Russian Federation.

    The Russian Federation was trying to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence in an attempt to strengthen its position in the Central Asian region. Russian leaders intensified cooperation with BRICS countries in order to overcome problems related to economic sanctions. Russia used the Syrian campaign and fight against Islamist terrorism to divert attention of the West from the Ukrainian conflict and to strengthen its world-power ambitions.

    Due to continuing tensions between the Russian Federation and the West, SIS focused on the Russian Federation and participating entities' attempts to influence the public opinion in the Slovak Republic.


    SIS was observing and assessing the situation in Belarus, especially foreign relations and power position of Alexander Lukashenko, but also economic situation in the country. Belarus and the Russian Federation used to have close ties and Belarus remained part of Russian sphere of influence in 2015, despite the declared attempts of President Lukashenko to cooperate with the West more intensively.

    Western Balkans

    SIS observed the situation in the Western Balkans, especially integration efforts of these states and the difficulties they faced caused by unsolved interethnic issues. Moreover, there were corruption issues, influence of organized crime and increased radical Islam.

    Serbia was under dominant influence of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. In the second half of 2015, it was hit by migration wave as a transit country and it did not have the capacities to handle the situation completely. SIS monitored Russian influence in the Western Balkans, which was most visible in Serbia.

    In Kosovo, the service monitored negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo regarding the normalization process of their relations and risks in case the agreement is not observed. There was unstable domestic political situation in 2015, caused by blockade of Parliament by the opposition and other anti-government protests. The opposition protested against the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia to establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities and against demarcation of borders with Montenegro. There was a temporary, significant increase of migration from Kosovo to the EU at the beginning of 2015, especially due to unfavorable social and economic situation.

    Bosnia and Herzegovina (BaH) – SIS paid attention to the complicated formation of governing structures at the level of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity (FoBaH) and at the level of the state. Disaccord among coalition partners in FoBaH caused the government of the entity to disintegrate in June 2015. At the end of the year, an agreement was reached stating that Union for a Better Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina would enter the coalition in FoBaH also at the state level in order to stabilize the political situation in the country. The president of the entity Republika Srpska (RS) Milorad Dodik brought up topics of justice referendum and RS public holiday referendum to commemorate its establishment. These referendums could strengthen the position of RS at the expense of the common state.

    Macedonia – SIS monitored the long-time domestic political crisis which worsened the overall security situation in the country and introduced serious security incidents near Macedonia-Kosovo border. An agreement between the government and the opposition as well as determining the date for early elections for April 24, 2016 eased the situation. Macedonia, just like Serbia, was hit by the migration wave in the second half of 2015.

    Montenegro – SIS monitored the situation related to the accession to NATO and fulfillment of the requirements. In the second half of the year, Democratic Front, a pro-Serbian opposition party organized long lasting protests against NATO which grew violent in some cases.

    Crisis and conflict regions

    SIS monitored political and security situation in crisis and conflict regions in the Middle East and North Africa. The security in the Slovak Republic and the EU was directly impacted by instability and civil wars in some states in the region; by the migration wave, which created risks of infiltration by people having ties with terrorist groups.

    Middle East – the service focused on possible expansion of Daesh (the so-called Islamic State). Despite territorial expansion of Daesh in Syria and Iraq was impeded in the second half of 2015, Daesh leadership was trying to create an impression of further expansion and it proclaimed some of their long-time operating regional Jihadi allied organizations in the Middle East, Africa and Asia their new “provinces”.

    SIS, together with partner services, was evaluating Daesh’s activities near the Syrian capital, Damascus, where Jihadist were trying to create their own enclaves in southern suburbs.

    In 2015, the service was assessing what impact ongoing military operations against Daesh in Iraq could possibly have on the political unity of the country, Sunni community support for Daesh, autonomist tendencies of some ethnic and religious communities and possible geopolitical consequences for the Middle East. Prime Minister H. al-Abadi did not succeed in reforming the security sector and getting the Shia militia under control. This militia took part in ethnic cleansing of the Sunni population and thus deepened sectarian hostilities and encouraged Sunni support of Daesh in Iraq.

    Turkey – SIS paid special attention to the parliamentary elections and the role this country played in the Syrian and migration crises. Main sphere of interest was the security situation along Turkey-Syria border and Daesh operations nearby, tolerating some Syrian Jihadi groups and their activities in Turkey by Turkish authorities.

    Corruption within border police in Turkey also played a significant role, since it cooperated with smugglers in some cases.

    The development in the Kurdish territories in Turkey, Syria and Iraq was also changing in 2015 since Kurdish militia played an increasingly important role in the fight against Daesh. Turkey was worried by strengthening of the self-constituted Kurdish autonomy in the north of Syria, which was one of the key factors contributing to the failure of the peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and resumption of fights in the south of Turkey.

    The general political and security situation in Egypt was complicated in 2015. SIS monitored how bad social and economic conditions and repression of Muslim Brotherhood and other opposing groups escalated the tension in the country and impacted the parliamentary elections in October 2015 and political stability of Egypt. SIS focused on activities of terrorist groups operating in the country. Their focus point was Sinai Peninsula with Sinai Province as the most active group (Egyptian Daesh affiliate). President A. F. as-Sisi's anti-terrorist campaign improved the security situation only slightly by having strengthened protection of the border with the Gaza Strip and by having eliminated smuggling activities and terrorist group cooperation in this region. Security forces and state representatives were Sinai Province and its followers' primary target. However, in 2015, this group's terrorist activities expanded to Cairo and the group started focusing on foreign targets as well.

    Libya – SIS monitored the development of domestic policy, security and economic situation that was getting more and more complicated throughout the year. The society and political scene became fragmented which made reaching of a consensus impossible. Maintaining power and influence over the controlled territories became top priority for armed forces in Libya. The economy is in serious crisis following the significant decrease of income for exported crude oil. Criminal and smuggling activities and money from illegal migration became a lucrative source of income. When partially pushed back, Libyan Daesh affiliate focused on maintaining and strengthening power in controlled territories.

    Increased terrorist threats to Slovak citizens in tourist destinations

    When monitoring terrorist threat to western tourists abroad, SIS paid special attention to increased threat of terrorist attacks or kidnappings by Daesh, its local affiliates and sympathizers.

    The service considers the states where Daesh had local allies, such as returnees from Syria or local extremist groups as the countries carrying a high risk of terrorist attacks. This risk was also increased by aggressive Daesh propaganda which was supposed to encourage attacks against western targets in Muslim states. This was confirmed by attacks in Egypt and Tunisia in 2015 which were inspired by Daesh propaganda. They were committed mostly by individuals or small groups who acted without logistic support by Daesh in Syria or Iraq. Operations were fairly unsophisticated and targets were usually weakly protected, such as hotels or other tourist places. However, foreigners fell victims to some of these attacks which shifted attention of world media to facilitators.

    Egyptian and Tunisian police reacted by implementing intensive security measures in tourist resorts. Nevertheless, professional level of security forces was below the required standard according to SIS. They were also unable to monitor all areas at risk due to capacity reasons. High level of corruption of airport employees, which might have been a factor behind the attack on a Russian Metrojet plane on the Sinai Peninsula in October 2015 was another serious problem.

    Security situation for foreign visitors got worse in Turkey as well. The Turkish government was facing conflicts with the Kurds in the east of the country and activities of Daesh terrorists coming from Syria. Power ambitions of President Erdogan also contributed to instability and tensions inside the Turkish society, since he had attempted to implement a presidential system in Turkey. The biggest threat was Daesh, which had support not only in key recruitment locations (Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, etc.), but also along important routes to Syria and basically in whole Turkey. According to SIS, the Kurdish-Turkish conflict did not present a major threat for foreign visitors since their presence in the Kurdish territories was limited and these areas were far from the regions frequently visited by tourists.

    Apart from terrorist attacks, citizens of western states in the Middle East and North Africa were also threatened by kidnappings. This was a real danger in some areas, such as regions far from urban areas, places untypical for tourists, since quick and effective reaction of security forces cannot be expected. Zones with active armed conflict and neighboring areas (Syria, Iraq, southeast of Turkey, northeast of Jordan and Yemen) and regions with weak or no presence of the state, such as remote areas in the Middle East or North Africa (Libya, west of Egypt, south of Tunisia) and in Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, south of Algeria) are considered areas with highest risk of kidnappings by SIS. Humanitarian workers and fans of adrenalin tourism or experience hiking were at most risk in these regions.

    3. Cooperation with state bodies and notification duty

    The Security Council of the Slovak Republic assigns tasks to SIS via its chairman in accordance with Section 2 of The Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 46/1993 Coll. on the Slovak Information Service as amended. The Security Council is an advisory body of the government of the Slovak Republic, presided over by Prime Minister and Director General of SIS is perpetually invited to meetings. The SIS Director General verbally informs members of the Security Council how SIS evaluates security situation in the Slovak Republic and in the world. The Committee for Coordination of Intelligence Services acting within the Security Council which discusses activities of intelligence services in Slovakia as well as security of the Slovak Republic. The SIS Director General is a member of this committee, Prime Minister is its chairman. The SIS Director General verbally informs the committee of meeting intelligence priorities and of current gathered intelligence of SIS.

    According to Act No. 46/1993 Coll., SIS uses official contacts with state bodies, institutions and offices of the Slovak Republic to obtain information and documents that help SIS perform its tasks. SIS members can establish official contacts with other state bodies if they are authorized by the SIS Director General.

    In 2015, SIS cooperated with other state bodies of the Slovak Republic especially in the field of state security.

    In 2015, the service cooperated with other state bodies through formal external liaisons. These bodies included the Office of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, central bodies of the state administration and other Slovak institutions.

    In 2015, SIS vetted 202 individuals at the request of Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic in accordance with section 19 (9) of Act No. 480/2002 Coll. on asylum and on change and amendments of some acts.

    SIS vetted 9588 individuals at the request of the Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the Presidium of the Police Force under Section 125 (6) of Act No. 404/2011 Coll. on residence of foreign nationals and on change and amendment of some acts.

    The service used the obtained information and materials for its analytical and operational activities. Feedback on intelligence production from our customers was important for us as it improved our intelligence activities and made them more effective.

    Intensive cooperation was commenced in the following areas: protection of classified information, vetting process, equipment certification, research and development in the fields of information technology and communications, cryptographic protection of information, protection against illicit use of information-technical means, legislation and international crisis management.

    As to multilateral cooperation on national level, the service played an active role in a number of interdepartmental working groups dealing with counterterrorism and extremism.

    Intelligence production for customers

    352 intelligence products in all areas of the Strategic Focus were elaborated for our customers in 2015: 212 (60%) focused on security, 78 (22%) focused on economy and 62 (18%) focused on foreign policy.

    See the details in the tables and the chart below:

    Tables and the chart: Overview of the intelligence production from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015

    4. State of affairs, basic activities and SIS oversight

    4.1 Personnel matters

    Basic indicators

    As to December 31, 2015, the total of SIS members accounted for 82,1 % of the planned state, which is almost identical to state on December 31, 2014.

    The personnel structure according to main demographic characteristics did not change fundamentally from the previous years. Men comprised 60% and women 40% of the personnel. 69.1% of SIS members have university education (including the first level of university education). 95.3 % of officers were in permanent civil service, less than 4.4% in preparatory civil service, and 0.3% in temporary civil service.

    Diagram: SIS personnel structure according to sex, age, education and type of civil service

    4.2 Budget spending and technical and material provisioning

    Total expenditures accounted for €44,330,385 (€2,000,000 capital expenditures) and binding indicators accounted for €162,000. They were approved by the Budget Act 385/2014 for the service in 2015.

    The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic issued four budget measures affecting the total amount of expenses of the service in 2015.

    Table: Binding indicators for the service’s budget chapter in 2016

    The funds intended for technical and material provisioning were used mainly for modernization of information and communication systems; logistic and technical preparation and SIS presidency in prestigious intelligence groups in 2015, for cryptographic and intelligence equipment and for modernization of premises, ensuring their operability and allowing for a higher level of classified information protection.

    Common expenses were used to cover obligatory and contractual payments, satisfy statutory entitlements, repair and maintain outdated equipment and repair malfunctions of the service’s premises.

    In 2015, SIS performed tasks in the technical and material supplies area in accordance with the generally binding and internal regulations. SIS drew finances from the state budget with the given purpose, efficiency and economy on mind.

    4.3 Information-technical means (ITM) and telecommunications confidentiality

    SIS submitted 258 requests for ITM use in 2015, none of them was rejected by the court. In one case, the use of ITM was not carried out for operational reasons.

    In detailed report on the use of ITM in 2015, 181 cases had been evaluated in respect of reaching the statutory purpose and goal (while all cases of ITM use realized in the first half of 2015 had already been evaluated). Statutory purpose and goal was achieved in 164 cases of ITM placements; it was not achieved in 17 cases of ITM placement (including one case that had not been realized). 77 ITM placements could not be evaluated to the date of detailed report since they were still ongoing or a 30-day period for evaluation of ITM placement upon its termination was in progress.

    Table : ITM report for 2015 (data from before April 1, 2016):

    As to the conditions of ITM use, the service fully abides by the Slovak Information Service Act 46/1993 and the Act on the Protection of Privacy Against the Illicit Use of Information-Technical Means 166/2003.

    The technical solutions used and strict organizational and control measures make for the legality of ITM placement and prevent unwarranted interference with service’s surveillance and data storage systems.

    All ITM placements in 2015 had obligatory judge's approval and none of the ITM placements was illicit.

    4.4 Cooperation with intelligence services from other countries

    SIS currently cooperates with 84 partner services from all over the world. This number has been increasing each year and it might increase to 86, since SIS is planning to launch cooperation with the Australian service ASIS and the New Zealand service NZIS.

    The services from the EU and NATO countries — particularly the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United States and V4 countries — were our key bilateral partners in 2015. Cooperation with the Balkan services was also very important in respect of meeting the service’s Strategic Focus objectives.

    Cooperation focused on protecting security, political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic and monitoring of risk and conflict regions. Main topics of bilateral cooperation last year were: counter-terrorism, extremism, illegal migration, activities of foreign intelligence services, proliferation of dual use material, illegal trade with military equipment and organized crime. There was also an intensive exchange on the development in Ukraine and other crisis regions (Syria, Iran). Apart from this, there were also several successful joint operations.

    SIS focused on the following issues within multilateral cooperation in 2015: exchange of information via communication channels and ensuring participation in expert meetings, preparation for Presidency of CTG (Counter Terrorism Group) scheduled for the second half of 2016. Experts from partner services visited to share their experience.

    Other cooperation with different groups continued in line with planned activities and strategic focus of the service (regular head of service meetings, working groups, seminars, etc.). Multi-platforms concentrated on counter-terrorism, extremism, proliferation of dual use items, illegal trade with defense-industry equipment, illegal migration, organized crime and activities of foreign intelligence services. The cooperation also targeted development in risk and conflict regions (Iran, Syria, and Ukraine). New topics emerged, such as CTG reform and the relations between the intelligence services and the EU.

    The agenda of the NATO body Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC) currently focuses on an early-warning project in case of crisis situations, aiming to improve cooperation between civil and military intelligence units within NATO.

    Table: SIS international cooperation overview

    4.5 Legislation and inspection


    Within the area of legislation, SIS cooperates with ministries, central state authorities and other state bodies. In 2015, SIS commented on 74 documents intended for interdepartmental consultation and raised 19 points of order. The aim of the comments was to draw proposer’s attention to issues arising from real-life application and develop a legal base for proper and effective performance of SIS legal tasks. Fundamental comments were discussed during interdepartmental consultation procedures. Some comments presented by SIS were implemented in respective materials.

    Apart from evaluating legislative documents as well as materials of conceptual and strategic nature (e.g. Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic), SIS participated in legislation work regarding draft bill on the Civil Intelligence Bureau and on the Military Intelligence and on change and amendment of some Acts (Act on intelligence services) and its submission for interdepartmental consultations. In connection with this draft bill, SIS representatives also attended consultations on fundamental comments helped eliminate contradictions in the amendment of this draft bill.

    SIS, reflecting international dimension of current threats (terrorist attacks, organized crime and illegal migration), actively participated in draft bill preparation in accordance with Resolution of the Security Council of the Slovak Republic No. 460 of November 11, 2015 and Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 639 of November 11, 2015 on Legislative Intention on CT Measures, aiming to make fight against terrorism more effective, especially in terms of information collection and preventive measures – the so-called anti-terrorist package. As a result of this participation, Act No. 444/2015 Coll. was adopted and it changes and amends Act No. 300/2005 Coll. Penal Code as amended and certain Acts (Act of the Slovak National Council No. 46/1993 Coll. on the Slovak Information Service as amended, Act of the Slovak National Council No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force as amended, Act No. 351/2011 Coll. on Electronic Communication as amended).


    In the field of state supervision, 13 planned inspections were conducted by inspectors and a hygiene officer, 8 inspections were conducted in the field of health and safety in civil service and in the field of security of technical equipment, 4 state inspections in the field of health protection and 1 state inspection focused on fire protection. On the basis of these inspections, 11 measures were ordered to eliminate the faults. 43 expert statements were issued in the building approval procedures. No statements excluding equipment from usage or cessation of operations were issued in 2015.

    5. A report on the activity of the National Security and Analytical Center (NBAC)

    The center, as an analytical, communication and cooperation workplace of SIS, continued to fulfill its tasks in interdepartmental exchange of information on security incidents and security threats against the Slovak Republic and its citizens. Its main task is to assess received information on incidents, events and phenomena and synthesize all accessible information on current security threats in the Slovak Republic via employees and members of state bodies serving in the Center.

    In 2015, the Centre informed our foreign partners about risks related to return of volunteers fighting in Ukraine and the system of threat assessment in the Slovak Republic. Due to particularly serious simultaneous terrorist attacks in France in November 2015, the Centre intensified information exchange with SIS partner services and NBAC partner centers. Above standard and constructive exchange of relevant information among departments represented in the Centre ensured quick response to our partners' requirements.

    The Center continued to develop the existing and establish new bilateral cooperation with foreign partners according to the plan.

    NBAC sent assessments of foreign threats against Slovak intelligence forces to Slovak customers, it dealt with suspicions related to non-transparent activities of a foreign citizen and weapon trade, paid attention to weapons of Slovak origin identified in the attack on the Charlie Hebdo editorial office in Paris in January 2015. The Center summarized information on the detention of a Slovak citizen in Brussels on the basis of a suspicion of an attempted terrorist attack, it warned about possible threats to the international EXPO 2015 exhibition and identified possible risks related a motorbike club from the Russian Federation which organized a ride through EU countries. NBAC paid attention to media reports on detention of a Slovak citizen in Turkey for illegal crossing of the Turkey-Syria border with the intention to join conflict in Syria, which was not confirmed. The Center assessed a terrorist threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Europe and informed its customers about a Slovak citizen suspected of participating in the Ukrainian conflict returning to the Slovak Republic.

    Two planned meetings of NBAC Council took place in 2015, aimed at security situation assessment regarding the Slovak Republic and its citizens, evaluating whether the terrorist threat level in Slovakia is up-to-date, discussion about creating a permanent Situation Center of the Slovak Republic and preparedness of NBAC to operate over the usual working time. There was an extraordinary NBAC Council meeting in reaction to the November terrorist attacks in one of EU and NATO member states with the aim of evaluating the impact of the Paris attacks on the Slovak Republic. In accordance with the Council's decision to improve efficiency of the Center and collection and assessment of information related to terrorism and other threats to the Slovak Republic, its citizens and interests, the Center started operating 24 hours a day. The 24/7 service proved the readiness of the Center to immediately coordinate actions of state bodies by determining appropriate reactions to existing threats. As the need of urgent international information exchange related to criminal destructive activities in France or other EU member states eventually ceased, the 24/7 operation of the Center was stopped after 18 days in December. Measures were taken in order to enable immediate restart of the 24/7 operation in case interdepartmental or international information exchange on security threats is needed.

    In accordance with the Code of Conduct, the Center participated in increased monitoring of security situation in the Slovak Republic due to organization of top political events and mass events of international importance as well as NATO military trainings in the Slovak Republic. The Center also monitored the 27th Winter Universiade in Slovakia as well as possible security threats to its participants.

    As to participation of Slovak citizens in international events abroad and events abroad with potential threat to Slovakia and its citizens, the Center joined assessment of security threats during the European Games in Baku, Azerbaijan.

    The Center cooperated with the state bodies represented in the Center while evaluating applicants for Schengen visas coming from risk countries, applicants for military service in armed forces of other states and security incidents in cyberspace.

    NBAC also attended meetings of the Expert Group for Exchange and Analysis of Information and Cooperation in CT that was established by the Committee of the Security Council for Coordination of Intelligence Services.

    The Centre and the professional expertise of individual departments were also utilized for lecturing purposes, aiming at employees of other state bodies. The lectures focused on the security situation in Afghanistan, situation in the east of Ukraine and its impact on the Slovak Republic and its citizens and the 2015 – 2020 cybersecurity concept.

    In the assessed period, the Centre, as requested by several state bodies, continued to organize thematic lectures for employees of state bodies and introduced tasks and operation of the Centre and raised awareness about interdepartmental cooperation of state bodies in the Slovak Republic.

    6. Summary

    In 2015, within its competence and within its authorities, SIS was collecting, storing, assessing and providing authorized legal recipients with information, thus fulfilling its tasks in the intelligence and contributing to the protection of the constitutional order of the Slovak Republic, to the security of the state and to the protection and the enforcement of foreign political and economic interests of the Slovak Republic.